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Preface
H€l&ne Cixous' Conception of Scriture feminine:
The Risky Subversion and the Celebration of Diffdrance
Writing is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the 
dwelling place of the other in me— the other that I am and 
am not, that I don't know how to be, but that I feel 
passing, that makes me live— that tears me apart, disturbs 
me, changes me, who?— a feminine one, a masculine one, 
some?— several, some unknown, which is indeed what gives me 
the desire to know and from which all life soars.
H616ne Cixous, "Sorties"
My projects arise from three different seminars: 
Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Law, and Philosophy of 
Ecology. As a student of philosophy and critical theory, I 
have become drawn to the notion of the body and its cultural 
constitution. One cannot philosophize the body without 
involving an inquiry into semiotics, and issues of gender, 
class, race, and sexuality. Being theoretically situated 
within post-structural philosophies, and grounded in 
feminist sensibility, I work from Kaja Silverman's 
assumption that "the human subject is to a large degree the 
subject of semiotics" (preface). What Silverman suggests 
here is the notion that signification (making meaning) 
occurs within and through discourse, that any discourse 
necessarily requires a subject, and that the subject itself
is an effect of discourses. Silverman's emphasis on 
psychoanalytic semiotics is critical because, as one of my 
professors said, "The psychoanalytic framework at least 
attempts to involve the body, whereas other philosophical 
and critical discourses tend to leave the body in the hazy 
realm of the sensual, or simply forget about it at all."
Within my theoretical discussions, I use a variety of 
methodologies posed by different philosophers and 
theoreticians in order to embrace the faculty of the body: 
psychoanalytic semiotics, deconstruction, Marxist criticism, 
psycho-linguistics, and feminist critique, to name the most 
dwelt upon approaches. I also assume the interconnections 
between literary, cinematic, and theoretical texts to enable 
a look at various cultural positions where our 
constructedness via language happens. In my endeavors of 
writing about the body, I search for places of resistance to 
challenge the patriarchal boundaries of Western metaphysics. 
As Teresa de Lauretis points out in Alice Doesn't, 
"Strategies of writing and of reading are forms of cultural 
resistance" (7).
For me, Helene Cixous' subversive theoretical position, 
whose philosophy I employ in most of my discussions, has 
offered some places of textual resistance. I want to devote 
my introduction to a presentation of Cixous' theoretical 
grounds in order to present a reader with the premises of my 
own readings.
Attempting to dispute gendered, hierarchical and linear 
discourse appraised in Western culture, Hdl^ne Cixous in 
"Sorties" draws on Jacques Derrida's critique of the 
logocentric constitution of Western thinking, and on his 
contention of language which through both difference and 
deferral always occupies the space of diffdrance *. Cixous' 
theoretical project aims at undermining the patriarchal 
sexual, social, and linguistic order operating on abstract 
truths, sharp dichotomic divisions, and reducing all 
categories to its own fixed terms. She attempts to subvert 
the logocentric ideology and to dismantle phallogocentrism. 
Her concept of ecriture feminine opposes the idea that 
meaning is fully present in language, and resists the 
supremacy of the phallus as the transcendental signifier.
In order to disrupt traditional phallogocentric 
discourse and to claim ecriture feminine in cultural terms, 
Cixous engages the concept of bisexuality. Her idea of 
bisexuality embraces the notion of the subject which 
recognizes otherness in itself, and "permits" the 
possibility of a mergence of all kinds of "I's." She calls 
bisexuality "the location within oneself of the presence of 
both sexes," and describes it as the unfixed space of 
differance, the sphere of fluidity, mobility, inviting and 
accepting the other in oneself (148). Such a view of 
bisexuality not only undermines the traditional category of
closure in women, men, language, and writing, but also 
celebrates the inclusion of difference.
In her statement "It is only in this condition [of 
bisexuality] that we invent," Cixous links philosophic or 
poetic creativity with the mobility of the self, with the 
inventing subject's desire to open its horizons of vision by 
embracing the other, and by giving it its own voice (147). 
Creativity then rests on the rejection of the repression of 
the "selves one didn't know" (147). Cixous argues that 
woman is bisexual because historically she already occupies 
the sphere of differance where the subject accepts its 
occupation by the other and permits it to speak. Unlike man 
who fears and rejects femininity within himself and 
cherishes his oneness, woman lives through difference.
Culturally defined masculinity has to repress and deny 
the feminine in order to enjoy the primacy of the phallus. 
Man does not need the other to be a masculine subject; in 
his encouraged monosexuality he can stand alone and claim 
himself as a harmonious self. In fact, through its 
disruption and dismemberment of the monoglossic unity, 
bisexuality poses itself as a serious threat to masculinity.
For Cixous, woman is a category produced and subsumed 
by the masculine discourse; she is a metaphor in writing.
Her provocative statement that "Writing is woman's" suggests 
that writing occupies the space of differance, and therefore 
displaces the rigid division between "masculine" and
v
"feminine" visions. Writing, understood in cultural terms, 
always disturbs the binary opposition of Woman/Man, and 
produces the realm of ambiguity. Since a woman is already 
speaking within the symbolic system which excludes her and 
situates her on the margins, she always writes from the 
place of ambivalence. Having no definition and no 
boundaries, woman travels through the unexplored and 
undefined space of both presence and absence. She is 
present because she "writes," but since there is no place 
for her in language, she functions as absence, both being 
emerged in the Symbolic Order and trying to move beyond it.
Cixous suggests that writing from the space of 
differance can be liberating, but that it also poses the 
danger of losing oneself, of transgressing the fixed limits 
of one's own subjectivity. Although she acknowledges that 
the linear masculine logic has erected rigid boundaries 
which differentiate by exclusion, Ecriture feminine is not 
prescribed exclusively to women. However, men, taught to 
resist the feminine, are less likely to free themselves from 
the phallic dominance and move beyond the authoritative 
discourse. Also, since men occupy language and claim it as 
their own property, they are less prone to attempt to 
subvert it.
To show how ecriture feminine can subvert the law of 
language, Cixous invokes the concept of "voler," i.e. 
"flying" and "stealing" at the same time. Ecriture feminine
does not appropriate the masculine power, but steals 
language and captures its structure only to make it fly, to 
shift its stable paradigm. This theft of the available 
resources suggests the possibility of shifting and 
relocating the fixed meaning in the realm of the symbolic 
order.
Cixous' own way of writing shows how "stealing" and 
"flying" work. She problematizes the question of style by 
displaying how content and form (and body and mind) exist 
and work together in fusion and cannot be separated. By 
writing a theoretical piece in a passionate, highly visual, 
and poetic way, she risks the accusation of being 
"emotional" and not "rational." But this is precisely her 
goal: she wants to demonstrate how writing lingers in the
space of differance, and how mind and body operate together. 
Being passionate and sensual does not have to signify 
irrationality. In fact, ecriture feminine aims at winning 
back our bodies and bringing them back to writing our 
visions.
Cixous claims that the power of the symbolic order has 
driven women away from their bodies. In the tradition of a 
male-oriented institution, Woman implies silence and 
subordination to the male centrality sustained by 
philosophy, art, and language. Phallocentrism has led women 
into self-distrust and self-rejection. To move beyond 
masculine discourse and "steal" and "fly," women need to
v i i
uproot themselves from the ideological supremacy of the male 
center and its binary reasoning.
v i i i
Notes
1. By attacking the monolithic, logocentric tradition 
of meaning making, Derrida problematizes the concept of 
truth. His project does not strive to redefine words, but 
points to their inevitably problematic structure. His 
analysis of "differance" as a concept carrying double 
significance of both difference and deferral shows that 
meaning can never be fully formed and fully present. 
Signification is produced through a series of differences 
and is always temporally deferred. Each time we speak or 
write, the significance or meaning is "promised" and then 
deferred, so we can never "catch," stabilize or define 
meaning. For that reason, Derrida does not want to classify 
differance as a concept since it would presume a static, 
identifiable and singular definition. Meaning in language 
always depends on differance and remains in constant 
movement, in a "play" with other words, in a process of 
appearing and disappearing. The breakdown of "differance" 
points to the fact that there not only is a double meaning
in words, but also that each word contains the power to
deconstruct itself through the embodiment of the opposite 
meaning. In other words, the "other" is always present to
the word; the word itself becomes absent from its own
center. We attempt to communicate meaning through language, 
but language itself does not offer a clear space where we
can proclaim the ultimate significance. Being aware that 
language always defers and that there is no fixed meaning 
(and therefore no stable significance), we can only play off 
the tension and the promise that is produced every time we 
engage ourselves in linguistic discourse.
x
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Writing the Body: Susan Griffin's Eco-Feminist
Project as a Critical Deconstruction of a Male 
Center and a Revision of Female Voices
We know ourselves to be made from this 
earth. We know this earth is made 
from our bodies.
Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature
Yet, "we-women" have never been the heroes of 
philosophy.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
"Displacement and the Discourse of Woman"
...you can't talk about a female sexuality, 
uniform, homogenous, classifiable into codes... 
Woman's imaginary is inexhaustible, like music, 
painting, writing: their stream of phantasms
is incredible. More so than men coaxed toward 
social success, toward sublimation, women are 
body (emphasis mine).
Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa"
Within the patriarchal realm of Western capitalism and 
consumerism that constantly moves us toward more complex 
industrial and urban spaces, the so-called "natural" 
environment continues to be devalued and devastated. For 
the past twenty years feminist scholars and activists have 
argued for the need to combine environmental efforts with 
the feminist sensibility. Because the grounds of the 
traditional environmental endeavors rest on the patriarchal 
models of domination, women's movements need to embrace the 
issues of environmental ethics and pierce through the 
dominant ideological structures that continue to oppress
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both women and nature. The theory and praxis of ecofeminism 
(ecological feminism) have emerged out of the strong 
conviction that the environment is a feminist issue. My 
project, working from Susan Griffin's book Woman and Nature, 
attempts to provide a terrain for re-thinking the way in 
which a feminist critic, informed by an ecofeminist agenda, 
can write and perform outside the binary oppositions of 
mind/body that have kept both women and nature under the 
power dynamics of patriarchy. My discussion, then, will 
necessarily involve an inquiry into the legacy of Western 
metaphysics, the construction of language, and the position 
of a female subject who attempts to write her body.
In order to address Woman and Nature effectively, first 
I want to present the theoretical grounds of ecofeminism 
that can be treated as a framework for Griffin's literary 
project. In her introduction to the section on 
"Ecofeminism" in the anthology, Environmental Philosophy, a 
feminist philosopher, Karen Warren, explains the foundation 
of the ecofeminist movement: "Many feminists have argued
that the goals of these two movements are mutually 
reinforcing; ultimately they involve the development of 
worldviews and practices that are not based on male-biased 
models of domination" (253). It is important to stress that 
there is no homogenous vision of ecofeminist sensibility; as 
Warren says, "What one takes to be a genuine ecofeminist 
position will depend largely on how one conceptualizes both
feminism and ecofeminism" (254). The area of ecofeminism 
embraces feminism, environmentalism, environmental 
philosophy, and philosophy in general, and it concerns 
itself with uncovering and breaking down the conceptual 
patriarchal paradigms of power that perpetuated the 
domination of women and nature. Ultimately, ecofeminism 
asks us to rethink the traditional notions of the self, 
rationality, moral and ethical values, and our understanding 
of the knower and the known. Generally, feminists who 
operate within this theoretical (and practical) sphere work 
from the premise that the patriarchal mind has historically 
devalued both nature and women and used them as a resource. 
Ecofeminism, then, challenges the realm of philosophy itself 
and aims "to replace conceptual schemes, theories, and 
practices that currently feminize nature and naturalize 
women to the mutual detriment of both with ones that do not" 
(Warren 265). The problem of "feminizing nature and 
naturalizing women" originates out of the mind/body 
dichotomy that has been perpetuated by the discourse of 
traditional philosophy.
H61ene Cixous in her passionate manifesto, "The Laugh 
of the Medusa," addresses the possibility of collapsing the 
mind/body dichotomy within language. I believe that Cixous' 
provocative statement "women are body," which I use for the 
motto of my discussion, attempts to respond to the tradition 
of Western metaphysics and its phallogocentric grounds which
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continue to influence the cultural discourse of philosophy, 
critical theory, and linguistic studies (343).
Historically, this legacy has not only produced a mind/body 
split, but it has also privileged the subjectivity of the 
white male intellectual who claims the central place in 
philosophical polemics about the ontological, 
epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic stipulations of 
human experience. Within this dichotomy, philosophy itself 
is associated with the power of reason which traditionally 
belongs to the male subject. Women, on the other hand, are 
identified with the body, both literally (through their 
reproductive abilities, for example) and philosophically, 
placing them outside the intellectual realm of reasoning and 
critical thinking.
Traditional logic links women and the body, devaluating 
both the critical agency of women and the status of the body 
itself. Although it may seem that Cixous, by emphasizing 
the body, only asserts the position already prescribed to 
women, I want to suggest that her contention that "women are 
body" aims at disrupting this inherited logic of either/or 
exclusionary oppositions, forcing us to move into a more 
dialectical way of thinking that embraces both/and 
sensibility. I see Cixous performing a double move in the 
attempt to claim a space of critical agency for a female 
subject. Rather then denying the faculty of the body, and 
perpetuating the exclusionary dichotomy of Western
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metaphysics, Cixous tries to collapse the binary oppositions 
of mind/body and to claim that both the body and mind exist 
and operate in a dialectical relationship. By reclaiming 
the rights of the body to be philosophical and the rights of 
the mind to be sensual, Cixous provides us with a subversive 
paradigm with which we can intervene in a traditional 
philosophical discourse. Through philosophizing the body 
and sensualizing the mind, she opens up a space for an 
inclusionary way of thinking.
I believe that this terrain of inclusionary, rather
than exclusionary, visions that Cixous posits and her
attempt to philosophize the body is exercised by Griffin in
Woman and Nature. Griffin's project, acknowledging that
environmental issues are feminist concerns, is rooted within
an ecofeminist sensibility. Woman and Nature is divided
into four books. The first two books, "Matter" and
"Separation," form, what I call, the project of
deconstruction. The last two books, "Passage" and "Her
vision: Now She Sees Through Her Own Eyes," develop the
project of construction. The project of deconstruction
traces the history of patriarchy's sensibility and its
resolutions about bodily matters. In her introduction,
Griffin describes the premise of her project as follows:
I begin the book by tracing a history of 
patriarchy's judgement about the nature of matter, 
or the nature of nature, and place these 
judgements side by side, chronologically, with 
men's opinions about the nature of women
throughout history. From this philosophical 
beginning the book becomes more actual, treating 
of the effect of patriarchal logic on material 
beings. And so the first book, "Matter," 
continues the analogy drawn between woman and 
nature into explorations of the earth, trees, 
cows, show horses and women's bodies as we all 
exist in patriarchy, (xvi)
The book on "Separation" begins with the image of woman's
body isolated from her womb, her desire and her
spirituality:
Her womb from her body. Separation. Her clitoris 
from her vulva. Cleaving. Desire from her body. 
We were told that bodies rising to heaven lose 
their vulvas, their ovaries, wombs, that her body 
in resurrection becomes a male body.(95)
This section reveals the splits that patriarchy requires us
to make: body from soul, intellect from passion, nature
from culture, to name a few. within her deconstructionist
endeavor, Griffin attacks the phallogocentric core of
Western scholarship and reveals its deep-rooted phobia of
woman and nature. By mapping the terrain of western
patriarchy and tracing its voice throughout 2,500 years of
Anglo-European history, Griffin disturbs the foundation of
male-oriented tradition. She discloses and critiques the
premises of Western patriarchal metaphysics, epistemology,
and the weight of its moral, religious and aesthetic values.
Her project tries to show how the oppressive patriarchal
conceptual framework, operating through a hierarchical logic
of domination, has come to control both women and nature,
and subsequently subsumed them into a masculine discourse.
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The constructionist project, which starts with the 
third book called "Passage," marks the liberating journey of 
female subjectivity away from the oppressive patriarchal 
norms. The last book, "Her Vision," re-conceives the 
patriarchal vision of the earth, and women's experience on 
it: "The book is not so much utopian as a description of a
different way of seeing" (Griffin xvi). Trying to unveil 
woman's presence and consciousness as separate from the 
patriarchal sensibility, and to reconstruct female voices, 
Griffin first identifies the oppressors in order to break 
down the patriarchal voice. The intensifying female voices 
challenge epistemological separations of body from soul, 
mind from emotion, which patriarchal consciousness requires 
women to make. Speaking through the body, both literally 
and metaphorically, these voices resist the subordination of 
body to mind, and refute the denotation of writing as a 
strictly mental endeavor. The "great chorus of woman and 
nature" (xvii) offers new ways of seeing and asserts that 
women's bodies can influence women's language and visions. 
Woman and Nature, then, proposes at first a 
deconstructionist step as a necessary phase to undo the 
dominant paradigms in order to provide us with a liberating, 
constructionist vision where women may begin reclaiming 
their bodies and finding an active space for their agency.
In order to explain the philosophical grounds of 
Griffin's deconstruction, I want for a moment to continue
8
the discussion of the workings of Western metaphysics and to 
present some feminist positions that are aimed at re-working 
it. Western philosophical thought has been dominated by the 
metaphysical logic of binary oppositions that operates on 
persistent juxtaposition of Matter and Soul, Presence and 
Absence, Being and Nothingness, Same and Other, Nature and 
Culture. Consequently, these oppositions allow for a 
hierarchy that esteems a "positive" side, and subdues its 
"negative" counterpart. As a result, the terms Masculine/ 
Feminine have also been subjugated to gendered, dichotomous 
oppositions, prescribing to women and men specific positions 
in society and in the history of civilization.
First, theoretically submissive to the concept of 
masculinity, woman emerges as a subordinate construct. She 
is man's antithesis, his other, the negative of the 
positive. These dichotomies have dominated Western 
discourse and have become a vehicle of meaning for 
understanding human experience. This dualistic mindset 
clearly has excluded women from the legitimate creation of 
any discourse: historical, philosophical, artistic or
literary. Women have been made conspicuously absent in the 
origination of speech and language. Cixous, for example, 
suggests that in order for a female subject to claim a space 
of agency within the cultural discourse she must construct 
her revolution within the linguistic realm, not outside it: 
"I-woman am going to blow up the Law: an explosion
9
henceforth possible and ineluctable; let it be done, right
now, in language" (343). The concept of "blowing up the
\
Law" suggests the possible resistance to the law of the 
Symbolic Order (i.e. language and its institutions) and its 
cultural coercion. By stressing that the defiance must take 
place in language, Cixous asserts the notion that our 
subjectivities are not only constructed through and within 
language, but also that we are never outside language and 
its workings. In other words, we cannot think about a 
radical social change and a transformation of philosophical 
paradigms without scrutinizing our positions within the 
cultural place of language: "Writing is precisely the very
possibility of change, the space that can serve as a 
springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement 
of a transformation of social and cultural structures" 
(Cixous 337).
Current feminist scholars have already started 
exploring the possibilities of working from and against the 
authoritarian institutions of language that have been 
stifling women and their critical agency. Shoshana Felman, 
for example, in her article, "Women and Madness: The
Critical Phallacy," analyzes female absence in language by 
looking at the loss of woman's identity in an overwhelmingly 
patriarchal culture. Attempting to decode cultural terms of 
gender and power, Felman genders Jacques Derrida's critical 
deconstruction of Western metaphysics. According to
10
Derrida, all Western discourse is built on the principle of 
"logocentrism," the domineering presence of a logos. This 
Logos— being God, Reason, or Truth— affirms the privileged 
status of a center through a hierarchical subordination of 
all the "opposite” qualities. 1 Although Felman accepts the 
notion of a center, her argument goes beyond Derrida's 
construct. Focusing on a notion of presence and absence in 
language, she identifies the center as an overtly masculine 
construct, revealing its male identity, its "male self­
presence and consciousness-to-itself" (8). Since the 
language of Western culture has been male-centered and has 
come to explain the world through hierarchical polarities, 
subsequently, Male, Mind, Culture, Spirit and Light have 
come to subjugate Female, Body, Nature, Matter and Darkness. 
Identified through a patriarchal context, woman remains 
deprived of a place in literary discourse. How then, does a 
woman writer create in a culture that has been originated, 
authored, and perpetuated by men?
In their essay "Infection in the Sentence," Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar engage this question in an attempt 
to find ways in which a woman author fits into the 
essentially male-centered literary history. Reduced to a 
marginal voice, a female writer does not "fit in;" whenever 
she picks up a pen "she seems to be anomalous, indefinable, 
alienated, a freakish outsider" (291). Thus, female writing 
emerges as both a revolt against patriarchal literary
11
authorship and a struggle to reclaim feminine identity.
Rebelling against this masculine uniformity, Griffin's Woman
and Nature not only marks and dismantles the oppressive
patriarchal voice, but also creates a fresh voice, or rather
an orchestration of female voices to deconstruct the
statement that woman is one, same, and easily definable:
So we say, finally, we know what happens in this 
darkness, what happens to us while we sleep, if we 
allow the night, if we allow what she is in the 
darkness to be, this knowledge, this that we have 
not yet named: what we are. (168)
Woman and Nature is conceived in an experimental style that
mixes poetry and prose, and speaks in the compelling voices
of women, animals, and land that ultimately subvert and
empty out the patriarchal center. Using Cixous' concept, I
want to suggest that Griffin is "blowing up the Law" by
resisting the patriarchal model of reasoning and by creating
a new vision of philosophical discourse within language.
Revolting against the male-centered order and power, 
Griffin proposes original ways of rethinking philosophical 
language and gives voice to those who have been denied 
identity and kept voiceless. The very place of her writing 
unsettles traditional masculine discourse. By undoing the 
institutionalized boundary between poetry and prose, and 
between the literary text and theory, Griffin demasculinizes 
the space of writing. Within her text, she creates a 
dialogized space to embrace both the patriarchal voice and 
the multiple voices of women who speak against this unified
12
space. Unlike the patriarchal narrative which constructs 
itself as dispassionate and rational, women's voices are 
embodied, impassioned, and situated within the physicality 
of their bodies and the materiality of the land.
The multiple voices of women and animals that Griffin 
brings to presence not only interrupt the patriarchal voice, 
but also create, to use Mikhail Bakhtin's terminology, 2 a 
heteroglossic discourse. I think that Griffin experiments 
with heteroglossia to show how the patriarchal voice, which 
pretends to operate on uniformity and sameness, can be 
challenged and fragmented through women's and nature's 
multiple visions, through their difference. Historically, 
women's difference had to be suppressed in order to ensure 
the homogeneity of the patriarchal discourse. Griffin's use 
of a heteroglossic address shows how women's otherness 
unsettles and disturbs the sameness dictated by systems of 
male authority, and disrupts the power of the dominant 
narrative.
Griffin's text also rethinks traditional philosophical 
argumentation, which, like the patriarchal voice she is 
tracking, poses itself as systematic, linear, logical, and 
rational. The faculty of the rational, which necessarily 
excludes the emotional, the bodily, and the sensual, has 
become the embodiment of the logic of domination. Within 
this dominant paradigm, any discourse that does not fall 
into the established category of the rational is rendered as
13
irrational and stigmatized as invalid. Ordering its logic 
through binary antagonisms, the patriarchal rationale makes 
no personal or experiential claims, denies the validity of 
individual experience, and in an inexorable, objective, and 
passive utterance, declares itself an omniscient judgement 
and the only true voice of humanity. The sensibility of 
patriarchal thought rests on statements like "...It is 
decided...It is said...It is stated...It is observed...," 
and exemplifies the oppressive nature of an "authoritative 
discourse" (Bakhtin's term). "Authoritative discourse" (or 
monoglossia) presents itself as the privileged language of 
hegemony which is undialogized, transcendent, and bodiless. 
The patriarchal voice, which establishes the dominant 
narratives of Western culture, claims the domain of 
philosophy itself; the constructedness of the philosophical 
sphere is posited as the sublime experience irrevocably 
connected with the faculty of the mind. The concept of the 
body, on the other hand, is a denigrated periphery which is 
always spoken for. Moreover, the refined space of 
philosophy is claimed to be the place of Truth which 
pretends to be singular, absolute and unchangeable. 
Consequently, the space of speaking (and critical thinking) 
is traditionally masculine. The male literary tradition, 
established and fed by the authoritative, monoglossic voice, 
absents female word, presence, significance and desire.
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I believe that Griffin goes into the unsettling 
research of reconstructing the patriarchal voice present in 
philosophy and literature to express the problem of address 
that this voice poses. Patriarchy has not only 
unobtrusively and consistently universalized and 
essentialized women, but it has also created a female 
ghostly subject: instead of speaking for themselves, women
have been repeatedly spoken for and about. In a similar 
fashion, the faculty of the body, also universalized, 
strictly gendered, and categorized, has appeared only in the 
form of a ghostly presence. The phallocentric discourse, 
then, claiming the site of a transcendent truth, is built on 
the idea of a double deprivileging: the depreciation of the
body and the dis-placement of woman (Spivak's term 3). In 
other words, the masculine discourse constructs itself on 
the premise of women's absence and on the grounds that the 
mind governs the body. Both the female subject and the 
faculty of the body have been denied the position of 
knowers, and instead have always functioned as objects of 
knowing. The displacement of women as autonomous subjects 
has sustained the pretended singularity of the male story. 
Griffin suggests that through reading and unfolding the 
patriarchal narrative we can read a female ghostly presence 
and the "hidden" intertextuality of the patriarchal 
voices 4. By putting together numerous enunciations of male 
philosophers, Griffin questions the stability of the
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patriarchal subject, and reveals how, contrary to its 
intentions, patriarchy does not speak in a coherent and 
unified voice.
Tracing the legacy of Western patriarchy, Griffin's 
text directly talks back to the biblical teachings, to the 
texts of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Darwin, Freud, Marx, 
Pavlov, and to many other male disputants of human reality, 
knowledge, morality, and sexuality. Western metaphysics not 
only sets a spirit-matter distinction that results in a 
mind-body dualism, but also decides that "the nature of a 
woman is passive, that she is a vessel waiting to be filled" 
(5). Man, associated with God and Reason, claims the soul, 
eternity, and lightness. God is a mathematician, and 
consequently, all Truth can be found in mathematics and 
logical reasoning. Science dominates nature like the spirit 
commands matter: "[T]he demon resides in the earth, it is
decided, in Hell, under our feet" (7). The patriarchal 
dogma decides that woman is closer to the earth, and 
therefore remains demonic and hellish, signifying material 
flesh and lust: "the devil's agent" (9). Despite being
categorized as a witch, a woman is also paradoxically 
labeled as child-like, defective, frail, of impotent body 
and mind, and intellectually incapable of embracing 
spiritual essence. A woman, born of man and named by him, 
will always remain a secondary creation blamed for sin, 
corruption, and loss of innocence. The only redemption for
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her inadequacy and monstrosity derives its power from the 
capacity to multiply the race of strong and omnipotent 
males. She has to stay in the domestic sphere, away from 
public life. Male virility, semen, and phallus, unify the 
power of the perfect being, potency, and knowledge: "It is 
decided that the ovum is passive and the sperm is 
adventurous" (29). Hence, men, being the legitimate agents 
who sustain civilization, have the right, and even 
obligation, to direct woman and nature: " A woman should be
an enthusiastic slave to the man to whom she has given her 
heart, it is declared" (32).
Uncovering the misogynistic core of the male center,
Griffin confronts and re-evaluates Christian thought which
has assisted in reinforcing hierarchical dualisms. She
strips this religion of its spiritual and ideological
facade, identifying it as a male-oriented faith. The Judeo-
Christian canon has pushed women to the margin, not only
placing guilt on them but also manipulating their
consciousnesses to the point that they are forbidden to
claim themselves:
Yes, they argued, considering only justice, the 
life of the unborn should be sacrificed to save 
the life of the mother. Yes, they exclaimed, they 
are not opposed to natural beauty. But does not 
charity ask that the mother prefer the life of her 
unborn infant over her own life? they asked. 
(118-119)
We were urged to weigh the mother's life against 
the life of her unborn. We were urged to weigh 
our lives against the lives of our children. (119)
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The Church, which through its biblical word assigned 
divinity to men, authorizes the condemnation of woman and 
nature. The Fall, caused by Eve's lascivious alliance with 
the Devil, removes from the earth its sublime bliss: 
originates mutability, decay, and death. The earth becomes 
the seat of sin, a vessel of darkness and bodily desire, 
ultimately subservient to the Divine Light. Nature is only 
ignorant matter with no vision, erudition, intelligence, or 
ability to comprehend itself. In a parallel way, woman's 
body carries carnal passion, deceit, and a mark of death: 
"all sin originated in the flesh of the body of a woman and 
lives in her body" (11). The Church, claiming to carry a 
torch of light and salvation, wages a war against women- 
witches who, in the dark wilderness of nature, make a pact 
with the devil: "all witchcraft comes from carnal lust
which is in women insatiable" (11). After women become 
objects of scrutiny, persecution, investigation, and 
torture, they are objectified, tormented, dehumanized, and 
burned. By first ascribing to women the power of black 
magic and then attempting to exterminate them, the 
patriarchal voice not only admits its fear of women but also 
asserts their power. Her menstrual blood, her bodily 
fluids, her corporeality, her womb, her nature are dangerous 
and threatening to the masculine sensibility. Either she 
will be consumed in flames or she will learn to fear her own 
nature, deny her sexuality, and become socialized as a
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compliant and mute counterpart of man. After all, "a 
virtuous wife is one who obeys her husband, as the Church 
obeys Christ" (10).
Above all, however, patriarchal discourse professes
female sexuality as subaltern and deficient: "And it is
said that girls are born castrated. And it is said that
small girls develop an envy of the penis and that women bear
a natural hostility toward men, a jealousy" (44). She is
declared to be passive and born nonresistant:
We are the empty vessel, the background, the body. 
We were told that since it is in our nature to be 
needed, that his need is our need, and that his 
happiness is our happiness in all things. And if 
we should suffer at his hands we must have wished 
for this suffering, that his sins are our sins, 
that without him, we are not. (102)
As a little girl, a woman suffers the discovery of a lack of
penis which results first in self-abasement, later in a
hatred of her mother, and ultimately in a scorn of all
womanhood. Suffering from penis-envy, a woman with "the
atrophied penis, a girl's clitoris" is lack, incompleteness,
and jealousy, surrendering to the phallus: the only
sexuality in which human worth and power reside (88).
Secretly, she desires to be hurt, raped, and consumed since
her destiny is pain: "the grown woman wishes to be
pierced," and "the ovum...is primordially masochistic" (45).
And, like women, the earth is pronounced as passive, ready
to be discovered, conquered, altered, named and possessed.
Animals are waiting to be tamed, trained, and hunted: "He
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breaks the wilderness. He clears the land of trees, brush, 
weed. The land is brought under his control" (52).
Unraveling the perverted logic of patriarchy in all of
its manifestations, Griffin shows how phallogocentric,
analytical and deductive reasoning rationalizes women's
exploitation, abuse, rape, female circumcisions,
hysterectomies, and breast surgeries. She aptly illustrates
how nature is invaded, technologized, radiated and polluted;
how women's bodies and land, being just the instruments and
vehicles for affirmation of male ownership and power, serve
as vessels to perpetuate the history of male creation:
He has pierced the veiling mountains, ridden the 
rivers, spanned the valley, measured the gorge: 
he has discovered. Now nothing of this place is 
unknown, and because of his knowledge, this land 
is forever changed. (48)
We have not learned the name for clitoris. We do 
not know what to call our vulvas. We have never 
seen our own vulvas. We know nothing about our 
wombs. These belong to men, we learn, only the 
men touch them, only the men seize them, name 
them, only the men have seen them. These are not 
part of us. (91)
Griffin reveals how both women and animals are
conceptualized as objects rather than autonomous subjects,
while men are viewed as conquerors, name-givers,
penetrators, and possessors. She discloses the ways in
which the fertility of women and nature is manipulated and
controlled, and men are made capable of and responsible for
"measuring" life:
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He counts the number of children being born. He 
measures the growth of food. He calculates the 
sum. He says that through quantities we find 
ultimate reality. (12 6)
The multiplicity of female voices that Griffin brings to
presence talk back to the patriarchal discourse which
dictates the separation of thought and feeling, the
categorization of human significance, and which drives the
search for the objective, universal Truth.
Bringing silence to language, by drawing upon women's 
unheard voices, Woman and Nature also questions and rethinks 
the aesthetic values of the patriarchal mind. Griffin, 
critical about these values, reworks their significance and 
reveals the reality of different aesthetics for women. 
Western art paints both women and land as territories 
submissive to the male gaze. 5 The standard of beauty, when 
applied to women, is bound to be competitive and aimed at 
the pleasure of the male voyeur. Classical paintings 
celebrate male voyeurism by displaying women as beautiful 
yet passionless aesthetic objects: sexually obtainable,
always available, silent, aware that the male spectator is 
judging their value. In the eyes of male authors, who use 
images of women as instrumental mediums, womankind is always 
looking for the assertion of her identity in male adoration. 
In the tradition of Western art, woman's "to-be-looked-at- 
ness" (Mulvey's term 6) grants man the visual pleasure and 
the power of the look. The way she appears to others is the 
source of success and validity of her life. HEAD OF A
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WOMAN, SEATED NUDE, THE MODEL, STANDING NUDE WITH RAISED
ARMS, RECLINING WOMAN, NUDE WOMAN, WOMAN WITH FAN, WOMAN AND
BIRD CAGE BY WINDOW are only a few of Griffin's
illustrations of women being the equivalent of objectified
flesh, always as articles of male desire, trapped by the eye
of the beholder-owner:
We testify that we were called woman. We were 
called woman and we were called nature and we were 
the objects of his art.(9$)
This art, which has bequeathed to us abundant images of nude
women-objects and dressed men-owners, constitutes the
artistic history of male creation. Displayed female nudity
is another garment woman wears. She is not a sexual, active
participant; her passion is repressed and subjugated.
Woman's body not only belongs to her husband-possessor but
is also converted into flesh and refused any sensibility:
"[S]he is the flesh, and he is the head" (100). In the
legacy of male aesthetics, WOMAN has become a rational
category of virginity, wifery, motherhood, or prostitution
subject to being taken, owned or given to: "she is part of
the body of the husband" (100). She has become everything
but an active and independent agent. She has been
prescribed numerous identities as her definitions:
we were called Lady Brett Ashley, we were called 
The False Duessa, harlot, heifer, mare and the 
nagging wife of Rip Van Winkle...we were called 
quail, slattern and Lady Macbeth...we were called 
shrew, we were called sow, we were called vixen... 
(99)
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Throughout the tradition of male creation, WOMAN emerges as 
a patriarchal construct with no history, no culture, no 
politics she can call her own. The validity of her being 
has been defined through the construct of masculinity and 
through its obsessions and aspirations for prestige, 
glamour, and ownership.
The patriarchal mind gives no space for woman's needs, 
desire, or passion. Western art plays on passion, but the 
generated desire never belongs to a woman; she is 
consistently the desired one, not being permitted to desire 
herself. The spectator-owner has the monopoly on passion, 
and paradoxically, a portrayed woman is denied the right to 
be sexual. John Berger's film, Ways of Seeing, engaged in a 
similar project of verifying Western art through the 
exploration of visual language, grasps the underlying 
messages of portraying women as objectified, packaged, and 
consumed images. His distinction between nakedness and 
nudity captures the contrast between being oneself and being 
seen naked by others, yet not being recognized for 
oneself. 7 Similarly, Griffin recognizes the male gaze as 
self-serving, aimed at the pleasure of the male spectator. 
Nude, dismembered, and displayed bodies, overtly saying that 
"the meaning of woman is to be meaningless," (100) carry 
bitter testimony of women's pain, humiliation, and absence.
Torn by the contradictions of patriarchy that ask women 
to be at once untouched yet attractive and luring, passive
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yet seductive, erotic yet motherly, women are placed in the
labyrinth of male manipulation. This labyrinth positions
women against other women, asks them to stay immature and
dependent, teaches them to fear their own body, schools them
in beautifying techniques, warns them not to get old, forces
them to keep themselves at a distance from other women, and
traps them in a circle of confusion:
The room in which the women fear time. In which 
she is afraid of becoming her mother. This 
labyrinth. The room in which women praise their 
clothing and sigh that they are no longer 
children. The room in which time is a mirror.
The labyrinth in which the women fear aging. (156)
Without a doubt in Western culture women fear aging. The
natural process of changing and growing older has been
devalued and rendered one of the major sources of women's
anxiety. Women are taught to aspire to achieve, what this
culture labels as, "ideal female beauty," through a
perpetual struggle to alter and disguise their bodies. They
are manipulated into losing contact with their bodies.
Within the patriarchal culture of consumerism, plastic
surgeries, cosmetics, and special diets acquire a magical
power offering success, love, and fulfillment. The media,
playing on women's fear of not being desirable, stimulate
them to purchase products instead of encouraging them to
make vital political decisions for themselves. Images of
women entangled in this patriarchal labyrinth have also been
researched by Jean Killbourne in her video project Still
Killing Us Softly. 8 Killbourne links the objectification
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and fragmentation of*women's bodies in commercial culture 
with the devaluing of feminine attributes, and most of all, 
with sexual violence and abuse.
These propagated images of women have also been
reworked by French feminists Helene Cixous and Luce
Irigaray, both advocates of l'ecriture feminine, "feminine
writing," which aims at defying phallogocentric discourse.
They claim that the patriarchal sexual and social order,
which operates on abstract truths, sharp divisions, and
which reduces everything to its own fixed terms, can be
resisted and consequently subverted by the power of
jouissance. 9 Through the concept of jouissance, Cixous and
Irigaray pose the existence of a unique way of seeing,
experiencing, and writing, which disputes the gendered,
hierarchical, logical, and linear discourse privileged in
Western culture. Wanting to bring the representations of
the body back to language, their discourse attempts to
resist the traditional inferiority of body to mind. Cixous
postulates: "Write yourself. Your body must be heard"
(338). She celebrates the female body and its faculty, and,
like Griffin, raises the issue of women's power and
significance that has been filtered through the primacy of
the phallus. Cixous writes:
Men have committed the greatest crime against 
women. Insidiously, violently, they have led them 
to hate women, to be their own enemies, to 
mobilize their immense strength against 
themselves, to be the executants of their virile 
needs. (336)
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Refusing to be entangled in the patriarchal labyrinth,
Cixous empties it out: "[W]e the labyrinths, the ladders,
the trampled spaces, the bevies— we are black and we are 
beautiful...Your continent is dark. Dark is dangerous" 
(336). Irigaray, repudiating traditional concepts of 
women's sexuality rationalized through masculine boundaries 
of phallic singularity, moves even further to suggest that 
woman is autoerotic. Marked by labial lips in continuous 
contact, "she is already two" (351) and, consequently, her 
sexuality is not one and "lacking," but multiple: "Her
sexuality, always at least double, goes even further: it is
plural" (353). Thus, the female imaginary, and female 
pleasures and language are not singular, but like her 
orgasm, they are multi-layered, multifaceted, and multi­
dimensional.
Like Griffin, writing through a fusion of female
voices, Cixous also resists the uniformity of womanhood:
"[N]o general woman, no one typical woman..."(334). Women
have been taught to keep themselves in the dark, to devalue
their passions and drives, to be swallowed by shame and
fear, to feel guilty. Irigaray, using Marxist terminology,
examines this historical exploitation of women:
For woman is traditionally a use-value for man, an 
exchange value among men; in other words, a 
commodity. As such, she remains the guardian of 
material substance, whose price will be 
established, in terms of the standard of their 
work and of their need/desire, by "subjects:" 
workers, merchants, consumers, women are marked
26
phallicly by their fathers, husbands, procurers. 
And this branding determines their value in 
sexual commerce. Woman is never anything but the 
locus of a more or less competitive exchange 
between two men, including the competition for the 
possession of mother earth. (355)
Above all, however, women have been driven away from their
bodies. In the tradition of male-oriented institutions,
WOMAN implies marginality. She is placed in the realm
subordinate to male centrality, which has been sustained by
the workings of philosophy, art, and language. "Parental-
conjugal phallocentrism" has led women into self-distrust
and self-rejection (Cixous 335). To move beyond a
patriarchal narrative structure, women need to uproot
themselves from the constraints of the male center and its
binary reasoning. Both Irigaray and Cixous suggest the
realm of sexuality and female bodies as a site for the re-
evaluation of women's positions. The metaphor of "writing
from the body" can verify and shift realities in which women
live, and eventually open new contexts for female
discourses. The radical socioeconomic change can come from
women themselves who will refuse categorization and
classification into male codes, and who will question their
prescribed identity by examining the history of their
oppression.
Griffin argues that patriarchal epistemology, obsessed 
with numbering, measuring, categorizing, and naming, does 
not negotiate an active space for female agency. The 
labyrinth entangles the female subject in renouncing her
needs, her fears, her sensuality. It educates her in how to 
hide her face by wearing a social mask of make-up. Year by 
year, she struggles with burying her intimate image, her 
feelings, her passion. The chapter, "The Room of The 
Dressing," where "women lament the darkness of women," puts 
continual demands on women to meet beauty standards 
according to male criteria (156). In this room, familiar to 
all women, they cover their bodies, paint their faces, dress 
their words, hide their secrets. They desire to speak and 
untangle the labyrinth, but they have no words: "the
temptation to speak becomes large and the fear of speaking 
larger" (156). Engaged in a beauty contest, they never 
touch, never feel each other's warmth, never trust each 
other. It is the room, "where the daughter denies she is 
anything like her mother" (156).
Since all spheres of human discourse have been claimed 
and subsumed by male power, even intimate acts like writing 
are not her own: "Maybe the language did not come to her,
she could not find the words. Maybe what she felt got 
turned in her mouth into other words" (111). She lacks 
words to describe her experience; she has no communal 
language, no written history. If she wants to be a 
successful speaker or writer, she has to familiarize herself 
with the male word and carry it on. 10
Griffin's radical construction project is left open, 
stressing the belief that women are in the process of
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finding their identities and voices. Unweaving the
patriarchal labyrinth, they are finding the space of agency.
This place of agency is necessarily complex in order to
challenge the monolithic construct of pleasure. Women are
falling out of the oppression of the Dressing Room. They
are slowly leaving this callous closure to enter a
liberating space where they can finally embrace their
bodies, passions, visions, and selves:
Where we uncover our bodies. Where we meet our 
outcast selves... Where we go into darkness.
Where we embrace darkness. Where we lie close to 
darkness, breathe when darkness breathes and find 
darkness inside ourselves... Where we are not 
afraid. Where joy is just under the surface.
Where we laugh. Where laughter fills us utterly 
when we see what we thought was horrible. Where 
our demands are endlessly received. Where 
revelation fills us with glee. (157)
"The Room of the Undressing" is a symbolic place where 
women re-think, re-claim, and re-possess their bodies, 
language, and sexuality. Dressed in female dreams and 
wants, this new space ruptures and subverts the male order. 
In Griffin's vision, the roaring inside women bursts and 
unleashes their spirits. The undressing room is the room 
where "words are undressed," (157) and where women are no 
longer vessels perpetuating men's names. This re-claimed 
labyrinth refutes the patriarchal argument by embracing 
darkness and chaos as women's own: "We are disorderly. We
have often disturbed the peace. Indeed, we study chaos— it 
points to the future" (175). This unveiled space, not 
separated from matter, has no center, no ending: "Space
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where, in her circling motion, she found an opening" (171). 
This metaphoric opening is filled with the memory of female 
mutilation, with anger that arrives roaring, with women's 
presence that breaks open, questions, alters, and restores 
the real beauty of women and land. It is the space where 
women declare their desires, re-make their time and collect 
their power:
The time of her growing awareness. The days of 
her bleeding. When she felt her body becomes 
strong. The year when her anger gave her clarity 
and all her weeping was filled with intelligence. 
The morning of her full powers. The celebration 
of her first gray hairs. The solemn recognition
of her coming age. (174)
In this new dimension filled with her private images, a 
woman creates her own weaving, her own art. WORKING WOMAN, 
OLD WOMAN FROM A POORHOUSE, PORTIA WOUNDING HER THIGH,
BISONS FLEEING A FIRE, WRAPPED IN SILENCE, LIFT EVERY VOICE
AND SING, COW'S SKULL WITH CALICO ROSES. She paints her 
pain, the river's pain, desert, wind, storm; she paints her 
rights and her time. She paints the loss of her name, marks 
rape, rage, isolation. She paints her body. "The Anatomy 
Lesson," in which a collage of voices speaks about body 
awakening, suggests the opening of the revision. If we are 
dedicated to reclaiming our selves, our past and history, we 
have to start with our bodies. We have to learn how to 
celebrate our bodies, how to take pleasure in our own locus. 
Female bodies, scared, worn out and altered by birthing, 
carry a testimony of women's lives: "We know that it was in
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her body that we began. And now we say that it is from her 
body that we learn. That we see our past" (209). Griffin 
visualizes woman's rebirth in a womb-like and earth-like 
cave, in a close connection to water, mountains, wind, and 
sand:
For we did not invent the blackbird, we say, we 
only invented her name. And we never invented 
ourselves, we admit... We know ourselves to be 
made from this earth. We know this earth is made 
from our bodies. For we see ourselves. And we 
are nature. We are nature seeing nature. We are 
nature with a concept of nature. (226)
Talking with voices of wind, waves, birds, and light, Woman
and Nature refuses to name and categorize woman and to call
nature. The inseparable union between humans and nature
that Griffin suggests, acknowledges and honors the origins
of our being.
Notes
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1. According to Jacques Derrida, Western metaphysics 
has organized itself around the domineering presence of a 
"central transcendental signified," or Logos. This central 
signified affirms the privileged status of a center through 
hierarchical subordination of all the "opposite" qualities. 
The word "transcendental" is crucial for an understanding of 
this concept. It suggests that this privileged signified—  
God, Reason, Truth—  "transcends" the given signifying 
system (language), that it is autonomous and independent of 
the system in which it operates, and that it is capable of 
going beyond it. The central signified's transcendence also 
suggests that this concept surpasses human experience and, 
therefore, can claim its superiority. Its centrality, on 
the other hand, implies that the whole system relies on it 
and is built around it. The center becomes a point of 
reference and presence that holds the Truth. Examining this 
organizing structure (also language) which builds itself 
upon a center, Derrida points out the sliding of privileged 
signifieds. He claims the possibility of replacing one 
privileged term by another, for example: Monad (center of
Neo-Platonism)-> God (center of Christianity)-> 
consciousness (center of Romanticism).
Derrida's deconstructive project rests on the 
assumption that "there was no center," i.e. that language is
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a system of differences with no "natural" or "universal" 
terms that exist outside culture and can be claimed as 
inherently and eternally "positive" or "singular." Also, 
Derrida's disclosure of a constructed center suggests the 
opening of language and interpretation. In other words, by 
acknowledging that "there is no center," Derrida argues that 
not only language is open to play, mutability, and limitless 
signification, but also that "one," stable, absolute and 
fixed meaning (like God, Monad or Logos) is an illusion. 
Moreover, Derrida's "deconstruction" of these privileged 
terms suggests that there are no "final" concepts that can 
limit signification. So, if there are no absolute 
signifieds, then each signified can again function as a 
signifier, making the process of signification a constant 
play. See Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
2. I am using here Mikhail Bakhtin's terminology 
concerning the theory of language in The Dialogic 
Imagination. The term "heteroglossia," in other words 
multivoicedness, is a discourse which undermines and 
disrupts "authoritative discourse," or "monoglossia;" i.e. a 
discourse that desires to hold to one voice. Defying the 
norms of systematic linguistics which tries to provide a 
unified and orderly model of a language, the notion of 
heteroglossia, permits a variety of discourses and suggests 
that meaning in any utterance is contextual and positional.
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Bakhtin calls the discourse which uses heteroglossia, 
"dialogism." Dialogism rests on the assumption that there 
is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which 
have the potential of conditioning others. See The Dialogic 
Imagination. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holoquist. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
3. I am referring to Spivak's notion of "double 
displacement" which she explains in her article 
"Displacement and the Discourse of Woman" (1983). Spivak 
renders the deconstructionist project problematic for a 
feminist critic. She argues that Derrida's critique of 
phallogocentrism still privileges masculine agency. Taking 
woman as his model ("Woman will be my subject") and writing 
about hymen, Derrida retains the concept of sexuality 
defined from the point of view of a masculine thinker 
(penetrator). She further argues that historically woman 
has been denied the position of a knower, and always 
functioned as an object of knowing. The metaphysical 
tradition, explicating masculine desire, has always 
displaced woman. in Derrida's deconstructive reading of 
that displacement, woman is displaced again because he 
speaks from the point of view of a penetrator.
4. According to the Dictionary of Literary Terms, the 
notion of "intertextuality" was introduced by Julia Kristeva 
to mark the interdependence of literary texts. Kristeva 
suggests that texts (philosophical, literary, etc.) are not
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isolated phenomena but rather that texts feed off one 
another. In other words, any signifying practice rests on 
"transposition;" i.e. on interconnectedness of meanings in 
various kinds of discourses. With this contention, she 
challenges the traditional notions of "originality" and 
singularity of meaning.
5. In Women and Film, Ann Kaplan discusses the male 
gaze as a patriarchal concept which defines and dominates 
women as erotic objects. Relegating women to silence and 
marginality, the male gaze carries social, political, 
economic, and sexual power, which refuses female presence. 
The sexualization and objectification of women in Hollywood 
cinema is not only for the purpose of eroticism; it is 
designated to invalidate the threat that women pose. 
Accordingly, Hollywood productions, based on the idea of the 
male gaze, repress the image of women as socially and 
sexually conscious and active beings who are prepared to 
negotiate their positions in society.
6. Laura Mulvey in her landmark essay on cinema,
"Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," (1975) analyzes how 
Hollywood films construct a "normative" heterosexual male 
viewer and his gaze. Mulvey suggests that the cinema lures 
a viewer through scopophilia, the pleasure of looking. For 
a viewer, the act of looking itself, voyeurism, becomes the 
source of gratification. Freud, for example, identifying 
scopophilia as one of the sexual instincts, understands it
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as looking at others as objects and submitting them to a 
dominant gaze. Drawing on Freud, Mulvey suggests that, in 
the traditional cinema, scopophilia implies the 
objectification of women who function as sexual objects of 
erotic spectacle. The male spectator consumes the seductive 
image of a woman, and woman's "to-be-looked-at-ness" grants 
him the visual pleasure and the power of the look. See 
"Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" in Issues in 
Feminist Film Criticism. Ed. Patricia Erens.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 28-40.
7. Berger argues that in Western art nudity implies 
submission and an awareness of being seen by the spectator.
A nude woman is often painted looking at herself in a 
mirror, which is meant to symbolize female vanity. 
Paradoxically, however, this image reveals the spectator's 
vanity who considers himself the ultimate judge of female 
beauty and perceives himself to be the source of woman's 
satisfaction and self-respect. Significantly, women are 
painted without pubic hair since hair is associated with 
threads of passion, energy, and sexuality. Berger believes 
that the importance of art and its aesthetic value 
representing a sublime human experience has been shifted. 
Paintings have become valuable objects to own, and if you 
buy a painting, you also buy the look and prestige it 
represents. Accordingly, your identity and value are being 
judged by what you possess.
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8. Researching the influence of advertising as a 
powerful force that influences us cumulatively and 
unconsciously, Killbourne argues that regardless of their 
age, women are surrounded by messages telling them they are
inadequate and unacceptable the way they are. To be
acceptable and thus successful, women have to strive to
transform themselves. Advertising polarizes feminine and 
masculine qualities through juxtaposing strong, invulnerable 
men with sexually-willing, submissive women. Above all, 
however, women are trivialized and brutalized by being 
turned into aesthetically pleasing objects that can be 
obtained and eventually consumed. Killbourne does not 
condemn the sexual imagery that advertising uses so 
extensively; but instead criticizes culture's pornographic 
attitude toward sex and its contempt for women which this 
attitude promotes.
9. The undertones of the French word jouissance
("pleasure") have been explained in New French Feminisms:
An Anthology:
This pleasure, when attributed to a woman, is 
considered to be of a different order from the 
pleasure that is represented within the male 
libidinal economy often described in terms of the 
capitalist gain and profit motive. Women's 
jouissance carries with it the notion of fluidity, 
diffusion, duration. It is a kind of potlatch in 
the world of orgasms, a giving, expending, 
dispensing of pleasure without concern about ends 
or closure. (36)
Jouissance is a concept in French theory signifying a
totality of satisfaction: intellectual, spiritual, physical,
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and sexual. Julia Kristeva, for example, argues that 
jouissance exists outside of linguistic norms in the realm 
of poetic language. Jouissance resists and disrupts the 
symbolic level of language, refusing to be ordered, 
structured, and controlled by political and cultural 
constraints.
10. As I struggle to write this essay, I find more and 
more that while arguing against masculine linear, logical 
reasoning, I consistently compose my writing using 
sophisticated, approved, academic language. I see myself 
trapped, feeling that I undermine my own grounds, at the 
same time realizing that I can't work against patriarchal 
discourse without using its terminology and methodology in 
order to dismantle it effectively. In my subversive 
attempts, I remember, however, that language as a signifying 
practice is the site of both cultural coercion and 
resistance.
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The Consumption of the Maternal Body in the Mirror 
Stage and Julia Kristeva's Revision 
of the Symbolic Paternal Agency
Jacques Lacan's concept of the Mirror Stage has been 
widely theoretized in various philosophical and literary 
discourses. The Lacanian Mirror Stage formation of the 
self, which has permeated studies across disciplines, has 
drawn substantial attention from feminist scholars. My 
project, following Julia Kristeva's revision and critique of 
Lacan's construction of subjectivity, discusses the status 
of the maternal body in the Mirror Stage.
Unraveling the maternal body from within the Lacanian 
Mirror Stage is an unsettling task of reading a ghostly 
presence of mother, or more specifically, of reading her 
absence. My writing, then, addresses the maternal as both 
present and absent in the Mirror Stage. In my analysis, I 
focus on the phobic model of the subject, which is built on 
and invites misogyny. I argue that this construct of 
subjectivity insists on maintaining the Symbolic 1 at work 
through the refusal to read the maternal. The erasure of 
the maternal, then, opens up a space for male subjectivity, 
making the female subject the bearer of meaning, not the 
maker of meaning. As a cultural example of the consumption 
of the maternal body, I offer a cinematic analysis of Ridley 
Scott's Alien and James Cameron's Aliens.
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To situate Lacan's concept of the formation of the 
unstable human subject and its relation to language, it is 
important to describe the notion of subjectivity itself and 
the way it has been theorized in opposition to traditional 
views of the human individual. In the tradition of Western 
metaphysics the human being has been perceived as a stable, 
autonomous "ego" that determines its own being. The 
Cartesian model governing that tradition, "I think, 
therefore I am," has set up the ego as a unified "I" who 
rules its being and controls the surrounding world through 
the power of its intellect. In this model, the individual 
not only shapes the world around him or herself, but also 
functions as the author/creator of meaning. Moreover, the 
"human condition" is characterized as universal and fixed.
Rejecting the notions of universal human nature,
Lacan's concept of subjectivity replaces it with cultural, 
social, and historical discourses. These discourses create 
the individual subject and shape its sensibility, still 
leaving a moving space for its transformation. Thus, the 
subject is open to change, shift, and fluidity. While the 
Cartesian transcendental ego defines itself as if it were in 
a political and social vacuum, the concept of subjectivity 
takes into account the social context of race, class, and 
gender. The notion of subjectivity also opposes the idea 
that "being" exists prior to linguistic practice, and it
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problematizes the relationship between the individual and 
language.
Theorists who work within these assumptions argue that 
our subjectivity is not pre-linguistic— i.e. that being or 
essence precedes existence and language— but constructed 
through various discourses. Ferdinand de Saussure, for 
example, undercuts the "natural" link between the signifier 
and the signified, 2 arguing instead that there is a 
cultural connection between the two. The "match" between 
the signifier and the signified is culturally enforced in 
order to affect and perpetuate the construction of reality. 
Prior to Saussure, the notion of the "natural" 
correspondence between the signifier and the signified 
assumed the existence of universal "being." Saussure 
subverts the belief in the inherent connection between the 
signifier and the signified, and points out that the concept 
of the signifier answering the signified is an illusion.
Following Saussure's insistence on the arbitrariness of 
language, Lacan collapses the traditional notion of "being." 
He argues that the process of the construction of 
subjectivity is not universal but historical. Suggesting 
the linkage between the notion of the Symbolic (i.e. 
language and its institutions) and the subject, Lacan 
proposes the idea that subjectivity is both constructed and 
determined through language.
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His conception of the subject opposes the Cartesian 
cogito which places itself in the epistemological center, 
and presents itself as fixed, coherent, intact, and 
universal. The subject, with its mobility, fluidity, and 
particularity undercuts the classical understanding of 
"being." The concept of the Cartesian transcendental ego 
privileges wholeness and fullness, trying to "fix" identity 
and to deny subjectivity as process. In this model "being" 
is presupposed as a stable and harmonious phenomenon. The 
subject-in-process, on the other hand, rests on 
fragmentation and splitting, problematizing belief in direct 
access to ourselves, our meaning, and truth. The unstable 
position of the subject defies permanence and moves "being" 
toward a dialectical dimension.
Within the Cartesian tradition, which is often referred 
to as the humanist tradition, the study of language had been 
"diachronic;" i.e. words were studied comparatively through 
their chronological advancement and analyzed through 
history. Lacan's psycho-linguistic theory of subject 
construction moves the study of language out of the abstract 
realm of grammar and lexicon, and links it with the 
enunciating subject. His dynamic vision of language stands 
in opposition to the traditional structural linguistic model 
which leaves out the body and privileges the intellect as 
capable of embracing and understanding the workings of 
language. Lacan's analysis not only problematizes and
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destabilizes the "I," but it also points to the dialectical 
relationship between the subject and language. The body and 
language are no longer locked in an exclusive binary scheme, 
but instead become mutually dependent and always in motion. 
Lacan insists that language speaks us as much as we speak 
it. His destabilization of the "I" carries powerful 
political implications: we are in a culture that has
privileged the static "I," and once this stability is 
removed, the unstable self becomes coded negatively and 
rendered an object of violence.
Lacan believes that one of the earliest stages of 
coherence in the construction of the "I" happens in the 
Mirror Stage, a stage in the development of subjectivity 
prior to the entry into language. He characterizes the 
Mirror Stage in terms of "spatial captation"(4). The child 
finds itself through its reflection in an image. However, 
what the subject experiences is not the wholeness of its 
"being," but the fragmentation of its body. Lacan argues 
that the privileging of the subject and its power invites 
the "misrecognition" of coherence, unity, and control since 
the very nature of the subject is difference. The Mirror 
Stage occurs before the subject finds itself in the Symbolic 
order, i.e. before the subject becomes objectified in the 
dialectic identification with the other, and before it is 
formed and determined in social terms. Lacan argues that in
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this stage a distinction is introduced between the self and 
the other.
Lacan describes the Mirror Stage as an "identification" 
stage, i.e. the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when it assumes an image (imago). By rendering its 
image, the subject becomes deluded by its autonomy and 
seduced by the novelty of the "spatial identification" (4). 
Lacan suggests that this position situates the subject in 
the imaginary realm, and sets up a split between the "I" and 
the subject's body. In other words, he argues that there is 
no "pure" subjectivity and no literal signification. His 
position, then, suggests that the very notion of the "I" is 
not inherent and "natural," but culturally constructed and 
variable. The "I" relies on what is other than itself. 
According to his theory, through the recognition of a female 
"other" who lacks access to the signifying effects of the 
phallus, the human subject gains entry into the Symbolic 
order of human culture. Significantly, the phallus, the 
symbol of the patriarchal privilege, functions as the 
governing signifier and the guarantor of meaning. The 
subject's identity, then, rests on its difference reflected 
back from the other. This curious other, the maternal, 
becomes erased, however, from the stage of subject 
construction. The only sign of the maternal in the Mirror 
Stage is the child's reflection in the mother's eyes.
46
The maternal then is both present and not present in 
the Mirror Stage: present as a mirror and a mere platform,
as a reflection for the human subject: passive, static,
unchangeable, and therefore universalized; not present in a 
sense that it has been theorized as the dis-embodied, 
dispassionate, and dis-connected place of "the maternal 
organism" (4). The maternal place of absence subsumes woman 
and her difference, and more importantly, differences 
between women.
Moreover, in the Mirror Stage, the Mother (necessarily 
with the capital "M" since Mother in this construct figures 
as an abstract idea) is freed from bodily pleasure, desire, 
and pain, and separated from the presence of blood and 
physicality. The Mother's obligatory spatial confinement 
not only traps her, but it also secures her invisibility. 
This exclusion of the representation of woman's pleasure 
becomes essential for the power of the Symbolic.
The only way Lacan writes about the relationship 
between the infant and the mother is through the negatively 
charged concept of a "primordial Discord" (4) between the 
two. His analysis instills the notion of the contamination 
of the subject by the maternal body which serves as a 
vessel. Supporting his suggestion with the research done by 
embryologists, Lacan claims that the infant is endowed with 
"the presence of certain humoral residues of the maternal 
organism" (4).
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The fact that there is no reciprocation or dialectical 
involvement between the infant and the mother privileges the 
infant, leaving the mother defaced, disfigured, unmarked, 
and reduced to the role of the "automaton" (3). Again, the 
maternal is then both "marked" and "unmarked": marked
through the Symbolic and the cultural representation of the 
mother, and unmarked because it is rejected and repudiated. 
The representation of woman's pleasure is necessarily left 
out since it cannot be measured in phallic terms. This 
exclusion perhaps helps construct Lacan's compulsory 
insistence on the universality of the formation of the 
subject.
The Mother, her agency, her painful and pleasurable 
circumstances, her desires, and needs disappear in the 
mirroring. Although the maternal is readable, it is 
consistently and purposefully not read. As the unsignified 
mirror site of the mirror, the maternal is marked as 
negative, reduced to the workings of "the phantoms" (2), and 
eventually eradicated from Lacanian analysis. Thus, the 
textual analysis of the maternal in the Mirror Stage has to 
come through reading the maternal absence. The consumption 
of the maternal points to its threatening presence and to 
the male subject's anxiety about the powerful faculty of the 
maternal.
One of Lacan's revisionists, Julia Kristeva, takes up 
the notion of the erasure of the maternal and attempts to
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reinstate its territory. Kristeva's recognition of the 
maternal role is not only a gesture to rescue the maternal 
from the abyss of mirror representation, but it is also a 
radical revision of Lacan's ethical position. In her essay, 
"From One Identity to An Other," Kristeva writes about the 
repression of the maternal element: "Language as symbolic
function constitutes itself at the cost of repressing 
instinctual drive and continuous relation to the mother" 
(136). However, to understand Kristeva's concept of the 
maternal, its powerful ethical and political implications, 
it is necessary to consider her rendition of language as a 
signifying process.
In "The System and the Speaking Subject," Kristeva, 
like Lacan, argues against the Cartesian conception of 
language and its transcendental ego that is "cut off from 
its body" (78). She also undercuts Noam Chomsky's model of 
Generative Grammar which discusses language only in abstract 
terms. Instead, she proposes a new linguistics which 
embraces both the signifying practice and moments of 
incomprehensibility, undecidability, disruptions, and 
silences. She centers her analysis on the transgression of 
the law of the Symbolic through the power of the Semiotic, 
arguing that the symbolic and the semiotic both create the 
signifying process. Both are cultural constructs which 
remain in a constant dialectical movement, always mutually 
intertwined. Kristeva writes:
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Because the subject is always both semiotic and 
symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be 
either 'exclusively' semiotic or 'exclusively' 
symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an 
indebtedness to both. ("Revolution" 93)
While the symbolic represents the paternal law under which
the official linguistic structures operate, the semiotic
embraces the disruptive forces of language which play with
syntax, undermine its order, and mark the realm of the
sensual. Thus, the semiotic disposition, as Kristeva calls
it, can be traced particularly in the poetic language which
refers to non-linguistic sounds, rhythm, music, painting,
dance, and bodily gestures. She also attributes "the
transsymbolic, transpaternal function" to the poetic
language (Desire 138). Thus, the subject of poetic language
"maintains itself at the cost of reactivating this repressed
instinctual, maternal element" (136). She links the
semiotic, which "introduces wandering and fuzziness into
language," both with the instinctual and the maternal (136).
Kristeva's investigation of maternal alterity is 
perhaps most visible in her essay "Stabat Mater." As Toril 
Moi writes in her introduction to The Kristeva Reader, 
Kristeva's study of the Virgin Mother coincides with her own 
experience of maternity (160). What is unusual about this 
essay is Kristeva's deliberate fragmentation of her writing 
and juxtaposition of her personal poetic language with 
theoretical religious discourse.
This stylistic move suggests, on the one hand, the 
radical splitting and othering of a pregnant woman, and on 
the other, the inadequacy of an official paternal discourse 
to embrace motherhood. Kristeva problematizes the question 
of the representation of the maternal by displaying both the 
symbolic and the semiotic dispositions working side by side. 
By writing a personal piece on the maternal in a passionate, 
highly visual, and poetic way in contrast to a theoretical 
"study," she risks the accusation of being "emotional" or 
"irrational." But, I think, this is precisely her goal: 
her visually mapped writing demonstrates how writing as a 
form of signifying practice lingers in the space of both the 
symbolic and the semiotic and how the personal narrative of 
the maternal always already works next to the historical 
discourse on motherhood.
Reevaluating the cult of the Virgin Mary, Kristeva 
argues that Western Christianity obliterates and disfigures 
Mary herself. Again, like the maternal itself, Mary is 
"marked" and "unmarked": marked through the miracle of the
immaculate conception and her position as the Mother of 
Jesus, and unmarked because impregnated without sexuality, 
having her body reduced to "the ear of the virginal body, 
the tears, and the breast" (194). Through her peculiar 
construction, the Virgin Mary becomes the "guardian of 
paternal power" (188). Kristeva sees Mary's ambivalence as 
having serious political and historical implications:
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[S]he is informed that filial relationship rests 
not with the flesh but with the name or, in other 
words, that any possible matrilinearism is to be 
repudiated and the symbolic link alone is to last. 
(188)
While reading Kristeva's theoretical argument, it 
becomes clear that the religious discourse of the West has 
worked to sanitize Mary of bodily pleasure, pain, or rage, 
and it has relegated her to the inaccessible sphere of the 
"virginal maternal" (199). By contrast, Kristeva's account 
of her own pregnancy shows the interweavings of her 
euphoria, affection, anguish, pain, and anger. The maternal 
she experiences cannot be translated into or controlled by 
the symbolic law: "My body is no longer mine, it doubles
up, suffers, bleeds..." (190). The language of the symbolic 
paternal agency is at best deficient to illustrate the 
immeasurable and unconfinable maternal body: "[L]anguage is
powerless to locate myself for and state myself to the 
other..." (196). Kristeva's insistence on a bodily 
division, scatteredness, and separation stands in opposition 
to the symbolic construct of the maternal which gives it 
either a space of "an exacerbated masochism" or a censored 
place of jouissance (200).
Kristeva hypothesizes that the concept of maternal 
virginity is a way of dealing with "feminine paranoia"
(199). She claims that belief in the mother is not only 
based on the repression of the maternal eroticism, but is 
also rooted in fear. Her own writing of the maternal works
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against this phobia, and, at the same time, recognizes that 
the paternal agency rests on the idea of controlling the 
maternal.
Aliens as an Example of the Colonization of the Maternal
Treating film as another signifying practice, I want to 
offer a discussion of Ridley Scott's Alien (1979) and its 
sequel, James Cameron's Aliens (1986), as examples of the 
cultural narratives which attempt to misconstruct, repress, 
and control the maternal. These unsettling science- 
fiction/horror constructs of Hollywood production have 
attracted the attention of feminist scholars who discuss the 
notion of woman as an alien, and the representation of 
motherhood as monstrosity. For example, in "vThe Battle of 
the Big Mamas': Feminism and the Alienation of Women,"
Susan Jeffords argues that Aliens "presents a Nfeminism' 
that can succeed only by making women valien' to themselves" 
(73). Lynda Zwinger, on the other hand, in her article, 
"Blood Relations: Feminist Theory Meets the Uncanny Alien
Bug Mother," addresses the issue of an uncanny figure of 
Mother who not only needs to be controlled but destroyed as 
well: "[T]he asexual-virgin mother Ripley appropriates the
big phalli of the Colonial Marine Corps and becomes a 
monstrous killing machine in order to fight an even more
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monstrous mother (supplied with multiple organic phalli) and 
thereby defeats the monster/mother in herself as well" (82).
To expand the idea of mother as monster, and to expose 
the cultural anxiety about motherhood which these texts 
disclose, I want to consider the birthing process in Alien/s 
as the fierce disruption and rupture of the body. I want to 
argue that the masculine diegetic space 3 of Alien/s 
attempts to colonize and control the monstrous female body 
which is constructed, policed, and eventually abandoned 
ambiguously by this very narrative (the closures of both 
Alien and Aliens leave the "monster" merely floating in 
outer space). The ideological discourse of these films 
abjects the Alien-Mother-Monster to preserve its own 
coherence and to present us with the image of the paternal 
colonizing victory. This unnerving theme of abjectness 
guides the films' structures, which attempt to preserve 
patriarchal signifying practice.
Both films address the question of women's access to 
power. While both female and male characters are presented 
as possessing seemingly equal power against the unknown 
horrifying strength of the Alien, the female protagonist, 
Ripley, gains access to power only in outer space, possibly 
suggesting that her feminism has no place yet within the 
human social structure. In one of the opening scenes of 
Aliens, when Ripley makes a report to the Company's 
executives about the deadly encounter with the Alien, her
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story is not believed and the "case" is closed without a 
command for further investigation. Her license to operate 
as a flight officer is suspended and she is given a mediocre 
job. Clearly, Ripley is powerless within the capitalistic 
operations of the Company. Her story is not only dismissed 
as invalid, but she is also punished for assuming the role 
of a "leader-survivor." It is only in cosmos that Ripley 
"wins": she overrides the Company's technology and becomes
staged as a "natural" commander who moves beyond the space 
of cold calculations and impersonal mediations. In other 
words, she rejects insensitivity, ruthless aggressiveness, 
and save-myself-first sensibility in order to face the 
Alien. As Jeffords warns us, however, "she is employing 
these characteristics (nurturing, unmediated communication) 
to reject the alien— the image of woman as reproducer" (7).
The narrative of Alien/s is occupied by historically 
masculine constructs: the capitalist Company, referred to
as "Mother," its technology and warfare gear, the aggressive 
Marine platoon fixated on the idea of destruction, and the 
masculine space of colonization itself. In this space, 
women characters are repeatedly alienated from each other, 
securing the order of the paternal law. In both films, 
Ripley does not bond with any female characters except for a 
child. In Alien, another female on board, Lambert, is 
represented as weak and passive, while in Aliens, a female 
Marine, Vazquez, is masculinized to the point that she blurs
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gender boundaries; "Hey, Vazquez, have you ever been 
mistaken for a man?" she is asked by her Marine comrade.
Ripley's character, meant to "rip," is explicitly 
masculinized in order to render her a suitable heroine for 
the colonizing process. From the very beginning she opposes 
"studying" the Alien and agrees to participate in the 
colonial trip only to destroy It. Throughout the narrative 
there are various codes of masculinity attributed to Ripley: 
her muscular body, her short hair, her smoking, her 
aggressiveness and leadership, and the harsh language she 
uses, just to name a few. At the same time, to prepare her 
for the role of mother— in a revised version of the nuclear 
family which emerges at the end of Aliens— Ripley is endowed 
with some overtly feminine, nurturing features. While both 
opening scenes show Ripley frozen in hypersleep with her 
cat, most of the scenes of Alien/s in outer space are 
devoted to her obsessive rescuing of a cat and a little 
girl-survivor, Newt. Clearly, the emphasis on the maternal 
drives, to use Kristeva's term, points to Ripley's future 
role as a mother. Ripley's position as "mother" is produced 
to reactivate the discourse of the family. Paradoxically, 
however, Ripley is linked with a child to whom she has not 
given birth, suggesting that, in fact, she is free from the 
bodily maternal.
To disclose the workings of "feminine paranoia," I am 
particularly interested in the battle scene between Ripley
/
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and the Alien which takes place in the gruesome vaginal 
abyss of the Mother/Monster ("Stabat Mater" 199). An 
asexual woman-warrior, Ripley is designated to fight the 
slimy, bountiful, and uncontrollable womb which poses a 
threat to humanity itself through its excessive and 
expandable power of reproduction. It becomes clear that the 
Aliens' destructive reproductive power is the most menacing 
concept to the colonizers. The Alien is threatening 
precisely because it is capable of giving birth to itself, 
of multiplying her body and powers beyond any imaginable 
control. As Jeffords observes: "The alien is an emblem of
fertility gone out of control, its power to reproduce 
unbounded, its desire unlimited" (80). Mothering and the 
woman-as-reproducer are the films' subtexts which, with the 
narrative closure, become subsumed by the triumph of the 
paternal Symbolic Order.
Kristeva, who complicates the concept of the Symbolic 
by introducing the notion of the abject, can be of help 
here. The abject "is radically excluded" from the 
established order and occupies the place where "meaning 
collapses" (2). Thus, the abject, which is the site of 
banishment and uncleanliness, stays at the borders of 
signification. Kristeva claims that the Symbolic Order 
thrusts the abject aside in order to stay pure and 
unaltered. The abject, then, secures the position of the 
Symbolic as intact: "It is thus not lack of cleanliness or
57
health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, 
system, order" (4). As she suggests, "the abject does not 
respect borders, positions, rules" (4). In this case, the 
Alien is clearly the abject: "ejected beyond the scope of
the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable" (1).
Throughout both films, the Alien-abject is referred to 
as "It," "They," or "She," suggesting the impossibility of 
pinning it down. Thus, the Alien's moveable identity poses 
a threat to the phallocentric Symbolic Order which 
constructs its system according to singular borders of 
identity. Clearly, the Alien-signifier transgresses the 
boundaries of homogeneity, gender, stability, and origin, 
and it becomes the site of collapsing meaning. The Alien 
successfully disrupts signification. Till the end, the 
spectator never finds out where the Alien comes from, where 
it belongs to, and where it is going. Thus, the narrative 
busily works towards the annihilation of the Alien-abject in 
order to restore a space where meaning finally "makes 
sense." The Alien's powerful fragmentation, multiplication, 
alteration, and gender mobility need to be suppressed to 
restore the disturbed power of the Symbolic.
The Alien's power and intelligence are unquestionable: 
its acidic blood melts both the human species and their 
technology; it can transgress all spatial boundaries; it can 
reproduce beyond any imaginable control; and it can fight 
with its own body. The Alien, unlike the colonizers, does
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not need any sophisticated weaponry to defend itself.
Through its fragmented, yet omnipotent body, the Alien is 
expandable, excessive, truculent, and indestructible. The 
Alien is a survivor. The Mother/Monster clearly not only 
violates the patriarchal order, but it also trespasses its 
prescribed cultural boundaries.
The Alien becomes both the abominable threat to the 
colonizers and a curious specimen which they want to possess 
and control. Through the representation of its body, the 
Alien is the site of repulsion and terror, but also of 
desire. The Alien's revolting and slimy "otherness" serves 
as the colonizers' excuse to cover up their own aggressive 
intentions and their colonizing ruthless expansion beyond 
space and time. In Alien, for example, Ash, the Company's 
android, enraptured by the Alien's "perfect organism" says, 
"I admire its purity," and opts for testing the Alien, even 
at the cost of endangering the crew members. The computer- 
Mother reveals to Ripley that the very mission of their ship 
Nostromo was to investigate and to bring back any 
intelligent organism. As Zwinger remarks: "The real story
is utterly monstrous: the Company has decided to use the
human crew as whatever kind of fodder it takes to bring back 
a truly appalling organism for the corporate biological 
warfare division" (75). In Aliens, Burke-the-ruthless 
colonizer, who even attempts to impregnate Ripley's body 
with the Alien's embryo by letting the baby-alien out of the
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testing canister while she is asleep, carries Ash's mission 
of appropriating the Alien for the Company's needs because 
the Alien is an "important species."
Although Alien/s attempts to privilege the clearly 
defined category of "the human," the very structure of the 
narrative successfully disrupts the human/animal, 
human/machine, and mother/monster distinctions. The moment 
the narratives of Alien/s set up these dichotomies, they 
become shifted, displaced, and confused. Thus, the constant 
interaction between the animal, machine, and human worlds 
becomes an underlying structure of the two films. The 
borders between humans and animals are set in the very 
beginning of Aliens when the belligerent and anxious Marines 
want to know if their mission is "just" another "bug-hunt." 
The Marines' impatient and ironic "yeah, yeah" during 
Ripley's lecture about the Alien's omnipotence suggests 
their unquestioned faith in the superiority of their 
technology. Curiously, the Marines label the Alien not only 
as a "bug," but also as an "illegal-alien," resonating 
xenophobic trepidations about the disruption of cultural 
"purity."
However, it is curious that the Marines also blur the 
division between the human and the machine. They are, to 
some extent, aliens themselves. They are "cyborgs"— hybrids 
of human and machine— whose aim is to terminate the enemy 
without any sentiments. The Marines-cyborgs represent the
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technological power of late capitalism at its best. They 
are "state-of-the-art" soldiers, "bad-asses," whose bodies 
blend in with the completely automated weaponry they 
possess. They have cameras attached to their heads, carry 
powerful guns glued to their hips, wear locators on their 
wrists and motion trackers. Their bodies carry knives, 
grenades, pistols, and as a fusion of automatons and humans, 
they are posed as capable of transgressing the boundary of 
human endurance and aptitude.
The very mise-en-scene of Alien/s unsuccessfully 
strives to fix the unruly human/animal boundary. The human 
characters are usually fully lit and well visible, unlike 
the Alien which occupies the concealed and ambiguous space 
of murkiness, ugliness, and repulsiveness. The constructed 
coherence and congruity of the human cast is constantly 
juxtaposed with the Alien's fragmentation and displacement. 
The Alien's space, however, is the Company's construct 
itself: the alienated station-colony, entangled metal
constructions, the maze of confusing hallways, wires, 
hanging chains, air-shafts, and claustrophobic laboratories.
The confusion of human/animal borders is displayed 
through the interaction between the crew members as well. 
When, in Aliens, Ripley understands that Burke serves as a 
merciless executor of the Company's colonizing interests, 
she expresses her disgust about his slimy intentions, thus 
upsetting the human/animal boundary again: "I don't know
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which species is worse." Later, when the crew has already 
lost several of its invincible Marines, and when an 
uncontrollable terror and darkness permeate the atmosphere, 
Ripley suggests: "They got the power." One of the Marines,
Hudson, who already lost his "cool," screams: "What do you
mean they got the power?! How could they cut the power, 
man, they are god-damn ANIMALS!!i
However, the ultimate disruption of human/animal 
borders and confusion of who the mother is and who the 
monster is comes with the staging of both the Alien and the 
Company itself. In Alien, the navigating Computer-Mother is 
not only programmed to bring the Alien back to earth, but it 
also betrays Ripley when its self-destructive mechanism 
refuses to turn off. Watching Ripley's desperate flight for 
survival, we are presented with the question of which 
monster is worse: the unknown Alien or the supposedly
familiar Mother-Company? Aliens, however, more so than the 
first film, reveals colonizing impulses which are aimed 
directly at the body. The colonized body, then, assumes the 
faculty of the maternal. Both the Company and the Alien 
operate within the same colonizing sensibility. Although 
the narrative attempts to romanticize the crew's struggle to 
rescue "humanity" itself from the aggressive "Big Mama" who 
is "running the whole show," the violent intrusion into the 
body is actually performed by both the Company and the 
Alien. The Company surgically implants PDTs (Personal Data
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Transmitters) in order to "possess" its colonists, just as 
the Alien penetrates the human body to lay its eggs inside 
it. As Jeffords concludes: "[T]he alien is the embodiment
of the Company's suppressed desires for control through 
complete colonization/inhabitation of the body" (76).
The Alien-mother, thus, is entangled in a mode of 
double colonization: while she is the target of the
Company's colonization, she herself attempts to colonize the 
human body and to blur the imaginable limits between what is 
human and what is animal. Her mergence with the human body, 
then, culminates in violent birthing. The Alien's 
reproductive cycle is crucial for understanding the idea of 
birth as a shattering intrusion and fracture. Mother/ 
Monster's egg produces a spider-like flying creature that 
impregnates a human being with the Alien's embryo. The seed 
then expands within the human breast and eventually births 
itself by piercing and rupturing the human body. The burst 
destroys the human body-base. Curiously, however, while in 
Alien the first victim of the Alien is a man, Kane, who dies 
through the Alien's birth (Zwinger calls it "[T]he bloody 
birth parody," and "a horrific erection parody"), Aliens 
shows only women's bodies as being disrupted and violated 
(75). While the male characters are being devoured by the 
Alien in off-screen space, the female characters (excluding 
masculinized Ripley) and the Alien become visible objects of 
violence. For example, the first colonizer whom the Marines
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find already in the Alien's slimy and oozing cocoon is a 
woman. Contaminated by the alien— as Jeffords says,
"[C]ontaminated by reproduction"— a woman begs to be 
destroyed (80). What this scene performs is the idea that 
reproduction itself is a threat and that it needs to be 
violently controlled. This unnerving phenomenon of 
rupturing women's bodies through birth, constructed to feed 
the spectatorial anxiety, reveals the phobic fear of the 
maternal that Kristeva writes about and the compulsive need 
to control it.
The happy-end emergence of the nuclear family with 
vulnerable, crippled father Hicks, triumphant-aggressive 
mother Ripley, and an adopted enduring child Newt does not 
challenge the patriarchal norms. As Jeffords observes: 
"Hicks is not simply a man Ripley met in space, but is 
instead a Marine sent there to protect the Company's 
interests; Newt is not Ripley's child, but is instead a 
daughter of the Company's colonizing strategies. The new 
family, product of the new vfeminism,' can now afford to 
stop fighting the corporate because it is the 
corporate" (77). The Alien's transgressing body, however, 
left drifting in the cosmos, holds the question of the 
maternal unresolved, still feeding the paternal agency with 
the trepidation about maternity.
Notes
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1. Linda Kintz in her chapter, "Relearning Language:
A Clean Break or the Mess of Coagulation," offers a 
comprehensive explanation of the Symbolic: "[T]he Symbolic-
-the larger, symbolic structures into which we are all 
inserted, the system of signs that organizes naming, syntax, 
semantics, denotations that historically precede us" (101). 
See The Subject's Tragedy: Political Poetics, Feminist
Theory and Drama. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1993) .
2. Saussure claims that a linguistic sign, e.g. a 
word, unites a concept and an acoustic image, not a thing 
and a name. He calls the concept "signified" and the 
acoustic image, a sound, "signifier." The unity of the two 
forms a complete sign, a verbal sound, a word. So, the 
"signifier" is the "sound-image," and the "signified" is the 
meaning generated by this sound. The signifier and the 
signified are always moving together and cannot exist 
separately.
3. In Aesthetics of Film, Jacques Aumont employs the 
literary terms of the narrative, narration and diegesis as 
useful for the study of cinematic images. The narrative is 
a literary term referring to telling a story. In cinema, 
however, the narrative is more complex as it embraces 
images, spoken and written words, sounds and music. Also,
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the film narrative is presented as a closed discourse. 
Narration concerns itself with the relation between the 
enunciator and the enunciation. Diegesis (a story) is 
characterized as the signified content, even if the content 
lacks "dramatic intensity." Diegesis presupposes the 
implementation of fictional elements (attracting the 
viewer's attention more to the imaginary than to the real). 
Diegesis refers to the story which is formed by a viewer/ 
subject who composes his/her unique narrative out of given 
elements. See Aesthetics of Film. Trans. Richard Neupert. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).
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War Upon the Body: Decoding Pornographic
Sensibility and Unleashing Female Desires
In the patriarchal landscape of modern culture, at the 
time when the intensification of violence against women is 
still rising, pornographic imagery has come to be treated as 
an enactment of male brutality. Trying to situate myself 
theoretically to write about pornography, I find myself 
amidst the split which has occurred within the feminist 
movement along the lines of what pornography might signify. 
Although both the anti-pornography and pro-pornography 
feminists critique violence against women, and 
objectification and fragmentation of women's bodies always 
available to the male consumers, they come up with different 
interpretations of how to "read" pornography and even 
dispute whether to read it at all.
The anti-porn feminists like Robin Morgan, Andrea 
Dworkin, Catherine MacKinnon, or Catherine Itzin generally 
equate male sexuality with violence, and perceive 
pornography as a depiction of this violence. In the 1980's, 
in Minneapolis, MacKinnon and Dworkin drafted a bill 
outlawing the depiction of sexual subordination of women, 
and defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of women through pictures or words" (MacKinnon 
300). On the other side of the spectrum, pro-porn feminists 
dispute this proposed definition of pornography and its 
suggested implication of women's protection against
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subordination and objectification. Lynne Segal, a pro-porn 
feminist, in "Does Pornography Cause violence?," describes 
the convictions of the Feminists Against Censorship group in 
this way: "They see it as a complete mistake to reduce the
dominance of sexism and misogyny in our culture to sexuality 
and its representations" (8). Generally, the pro-porn, 
anti-censorship feminists suggest that what we need is not 
the termination of pornographic imagery, but more sexually 
outspoken materials produced by women coming from different 
racial and class backgrounds. What becomes critical in 
their discussion is also the need to debate a diversity of 
sexual representations in women's lives like masturbation, 
S/M relations, bondage, or homosexuality, together with the 
pressing economic and social issues of women's exploitation. 
My project stands on the pro-porn side. While closely 
examining the binary opposition between pornography and 
erotica, which appears to stand at the center of the anti­
porn debate, I want to seek the possibilities of a feminist 
re-reading of power, pleasure, and the politics of the gaze.
The unsettling and multilayered discourse of 
pornography not only consistently refuses to order itself in 
a coherent fashion, but it also resists a stable and fixed 
interpretation. It seems crucial to stress that the 
discourse of pornography has not been the monolithic 
construct it is often presented to be. Carol Clover in her
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introduction to Dirty Looks, an anthology which stands on
the anti-censorship side, writes:
It [pornography] comprises a great variety of 
images and scenarios, many of which fall outside 
the standard scheme of male-female relations, many 
of which contradict one another, and many of which 
have little to do with women (as in the case of 
gay male or male transvestite pornography, for 
example) or even with men (lesbian pornography). 
(2 )
What Clover rightly addresses is the complicatedness and 
multiple layering of pornographic imagery. She draws our 
attention to the fact that we cannot address pornographic 
sensibility solely in terms of the heterosexual dominant 
structure. The heterosexual normative model which has 
historically presented itself as the "universal," and 
therefore the legitimate mode of being, is constantly being 
resisted by both theory and praxis. For example, Judith 
Butler in Bodies that Matter undermines the Lacanian concept 
of the phallus as the transcendental signifier which always 
guarantees full meaning (89). She suggests that because the 
phallus is only a part of the signifying practice and not 
its origin, it is as "moveable" as any other signifier. In 
other words, the phallus as a privileged signifier is not 
static and fixed, but fluid and open to signifying 
modulations. Butler claims that the notion of the phallus 
as a privileged signifier comes from its cultural 
reinforcement, but precisely because it is constructed, it 
can be manipulated and deprivileged.
Butler herself performs such a manipulation in the 
chapter "The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological 
Imaginary" where she introduces the idea of the lesbian 
phallus, which displaces the notion of the penis as the 
imaginary site of power. By displacing the idea of the 
penis— as the symbol of the heterosexist scheme— Butler 
suggests that sexual difference does not depend on the 
anatomical parts themselves. The lesbian phallus frees 
bodily desires from the monolithic concept of pleasure. 
Butler also proposes that to say the phallus is lesbian both 
suggests that it is and it is not the site of masculine 
power. The lesbian phallus evokes the equation of the 
phallus with the penis, but at the same time, through its 
reconfiguration, it undercuts this equation. Thus, the 
lesbian phallus elicits the idea of the penis and erases it. 
By constructing the notion of the lesbian phallus, Butler 
undercuts the normative, heterosexist model of "sex" which 
seeks to fix gender. Resisting this assumption, she insists 
that the concept of sexuality is not locked in a fixed 
heterosexual framework, but that it is open to the workings 
of the signifying practice itself. Thus, a "reading" of 
pornography necessarily needs to overstep the boundary of 
the heterosexist frame in order to challenge the normative 
vision of sexuality.
The deprivileging of the imaginary phallus and the 
factual penis that Butler talks about can be seen, for
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example, in On Our Backs, a pro-porn, anti-censorship 
magazine "for the adventurous lesbian." The March/April 
1994 issue of On Our Backs features, as its special concern, 
questions and representations of lesbians, sex, and 
motherhood. The magazine boldly embraces the idea of the 
pornographic body (Clover's term) by presenting women who 
are nude and pregnant. I think that the unsettling black 
and white photographs of OOB successfully collapse the rigid 
binary of "pornography" and "erotica" set by pro-censorship 
feminists. Instead of maintaining firm borders, these 
photographs start occupying the space of fluidity which 
resists clear-cut codification.
The pornography/erotica split has played a crucial role 
in the anti-porn and pro-censorship debate. In her book 
Pornography: Men Possessing Women, Andrea Dworkin, who has
provided one of the strongest feminist voices in the anti­
pornography campaign, refers to this division:
Feminists have made honorable efforts to define 
the difference [between pornography and erotica], 
in general asserting that erotica involves 
mutuality and reciprocity, whereas pornography 
involves dominance and violence, (preface)
This boundary of difference between "mutuality" and
"violence," however, refuses to stay fixed. For example,
one of the articles in this issue of OOB presents an image
of a pregnant woman with an attached dildo harness. This
photograph might be interpreted as violent, but, as a
photographic representation of a text, this picture becomes
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a visual enactment of the writing, which describes a love 
scene between two lesbians, one of whom is pregnant (30-31). 
The impossibility of determining a fixed enclosure between 
"violence/dominance" and "mutuality/ reciprocity," that 
Dworkin stresses as the critical distinction between 
pornography and erotica, shows in this particular instance 
not only a resistance to this strict dichotomy but also an 
effective explosion of its theoretical framework.
I analyze the image of a pregnant body with a dildo
harness to challenge and complicate Dworkin's argument about
the position of a woman in heterosexual intercourse, where
the female is portrayed as the passive object/recipient of
the invading male sexual power, and where male violence is
projected as "natural." Dworkin also assumes the
heterosexual model as the normative sexual mode of
expressing one's desire:
Sex, a word potentially so inclusive and 
evocative, is whittled down by the male so that, 
in fact, it means penile intromission. Commonly 
referred to as "it," sex is defined in action only 
by what the male does with his penis. Fucking—  
the penis thrusting— is the magical, hidden 
meaning of "it," the reason for sex, the expensive 
experience through which the male realizes his 
sexual power. In practice, fucking is an act of 
possession— simultaneously and act of ownership, 
taking, force; it is conquering; it expresses in 
intimacy power over and against, body to body, 
person to thing. "The sex act" means penile 
intromission followed by penile thrusting, or 
fucking. The woman is acted on; the man acts and 
through action expresses sexual power, the power 
of masculinity. Fucking requires that the male 
act on one who has less power and this valuation 
is so deep, so completely implicit in the act, 
that the one who is fucked is stigmatized as
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feminine during the act even when not anatomically 
female. In the male system, sex is the penis, the 
penis is sexual power, its use in fucking is 
manhood [emphasis added]. (23)
I quote this long passage to show that ultimately Dworkin
does not challenge the patriarchal structure at work and
does not negotiate an active space for female subjectivity.
Rather, she reinforces male privilege, and, by using
pornographic language, she further objectifies and
victimizes the female subject. I want to argue that Dworkin
universalizes the female body while neglecting its
specificities and particularities amidst the multiplicity of
sexual practices. She also ascribes passivity to female
subjects as their "normal" sexual mode. Female desire is
presented here as either non-existent or static at best, and
it constructs itself as forever fixed by the workings of the
masculine power. Describing heterosexual intercourse in
such a way, Dworkin privileges male desire by locating the
penis at the center of her discourse. Linda Williams in her
book Hard Core challenges this very assumption:
If phallic sexuality is contaminated by power, 
this tactic seems to say, if it is essentially 
violent and perverse, then female sexuality shall 
be defined as its opposite: as not-violent and
not-perverse— a pure and natural pleasure 
uncontaminated by power. (20)
As Williams appropriately suggests, the relations of power
cannot be left out of the discussion on female sexuality.
In other words, Williams opposes Dworkin's idea that male
sexuality is inherently violent and that women are asexual
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beings occupying the space of sensual gentleness, free of 
power relations.
The female lovers described in the text next to the 
dildo-with-a-harness-photograph both metaphorically and 
literally possess the "lesbian phallus." More importantly, 
however, the dildo/phallus belongs to both women. The 
interchangeability of the dildo/phallus suggests the 
shifting power positions between the lovers and their 
attempt to collapse Dworkin's sexual categories of 
subject/object. Moreover, the pregnant woman, whose 
"natural" mode might be thought of as gentle and non­
violent, is instead portrayed as the instigating seductress 
who acts roughly and fervently. The lesbian women, who both 
"own" the penis, undercut Dworkin's assumption that the 
owner of the penis is inherently the powerful male subject 
performing the violent act of penetration. Clearly, the 
artificial penis does not become the center of their 
intercourse, as Dworkin would like to have it, but rather it 
is used as one of the many ways in which their sexual play 
is expressed.
This pornography/erotica split inevitably emerges in
almost any discussion on pornography. For example, in the
documentary film Patently Offensive: Porn under Siege
(1992), one of the representatives of Women Against
Pornography describes this separation in the following way:
We make a distinction between pornography and 
erotica. We define erotica as any kind of
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sexually explicit material premised on equality, 
mutuality, reciprocity. One of the unfortunate 
problems is the pornographers have a habit of 
calling a lot of the material they produce, that 
is very demeaning to women, that subordinates 
women, "erotica." So, there is a little bit of a 
problem with language [emphasis added] here.
Ruby Rich in her discussion of yet another documentary on
pornography, Not a Love Story (1983), addresses this very
issue of language. I believe that she attempts to reveal
and undermine the disorderly distinction between porn and
erotica and to move us into a more dialectical space of
understanding language:
But, what is pornography and what is eroticism?
One is bad, the other is good (guess which).
Fixing the dividing line is rather like redlining 
a neighborhood: the "bad" neighborhood is always
the place where someone else lives. Porn is the 
same. If I like it, it's erotic; if you like it, 
it's pornographic. (410)
The arbitrariness of signs becomes critical to this question
of meaning because language itself, as a signifying
practice, refuses to signify universally and to provide a
timeless interpretation regardless of the specificity of
social and historical conditions. 1
Butler's discussion of language can aptly illustrate
the impossibility of fixing language and interpretation.
Working off the assumption that we cannot fully control or
own the discourse, Butler undermines the idea of the
"authorial intention." Language inevitably "escapes" the
writer (writer understood in a broad sense of this word to
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include those who "produce" pornography as well) and refuses 
to order itself in an unchangeable and stable fashion. The 
one who produces speech always already works in a space of 
moving signification and, therefore, neither can fully 
control his/her discursive production nor prevent 
signification from working against his/her intentions.
Butler also argues that we cannot own signification; 
interpretation of one's words always leaves us in an open, 
often vulnerable place where we speak and are spoken at the 
same time (241). Thus, in the light of this assumption, the 
very idea of deciding to produce or "read" pornographic 
materials in terms of fixed meaning becomes futile at best.
I believe that post-structural theory, which addresses the 
notion that "meaning" is not stable but positional, stays 
crucial for decoding the pornographic sensibility. 2
And one may ask now why is the discussion of language 
vital to the debate on pornography? Being situated in a 
post-structural theoretical framework, I believe that we 
cannot talk about cultural representations (porn being one 
of them) without reminding ourselves that we are always 
already creating within the linguistic space of a 
historically specific culture. We need to look at the 
institution of pornography as a cultural form that is 
unstable and historically shifting. By doing this, we may 
start challenging the anti-porn position that the very 
institution of porn refuses a space for female agency. We
78
may also start looking at places, like the performance art 
of Annie Sprinkle, Susie Bright, or Valie Export, where 
women can negotiate a dynamic space for their agency within 
the heterogeneity of sexual representations. Porn is 
language, and yet, it has often been talked about as if it 
existed outside language, outside specific cultural and 
socio-historical contexts. Relating post-structural theory 
to the persistent porn/erotica distinction, I want to 
emphasize, using Linda William's words, that "one person's 
pornography is another person's erotica" (6).
The marginalization of the pornographic discourse and 
its degradation to the lowest ranks of art is also 
historically connected with traditional perceptions of 
artistic creation. The porn/erotica debate is inevitably 
linked with the polemic on high and low art. Traditional 
aesthetic concepts consider art as a sublime value which can 
be embraced only by a sophisticated audience. Within this 
theoretical framework, art is positioned as a separate 
sphere of experience, accessible exclusively to preferred 
spectators and participants. Thus, the intellectual 
(historically white male) is destined to experience sublime 
art, which poses itself as "true." The "ordinary" 
spectator, not being refined enough, is left out and denied 
access to this experience. Considering this notion of art 
alongside the issue of pornography, I want to quote Clover 
who addresses this situation in the following way:
"Pornography's shame lies in the fact that it has one 
simple, unequivocal intention: to excite its consumer. We
are in general suspicious of forms ... that aim themselves 
so directly at the body ..." (3). Clover draws on an 
assumption which claims that there are two separate spheres 
of experiencing art forms: through the power of the
intellect and through the body. Not surprisingly, forms 
that are considered intellectual (psychological dramas, 
experimental films, for example) are traditionally linked 
with the mind, while "lower" forms like melodramas or horror 
films (Clover's example) are associated with bodily 
experience. Without a doubt, pornography falls into the 
category of low art; Whereas erotica occupies the realm of 
high art.
The weight of this logic suggests that erotica is the 
legitimate sexual mode expressed in art, while porn is the 
dirty discourse capable of dangerously exciting the body. 
Because pornography is often thought of as aiming only at 
the body, the arising implication suggests that porn does 
not have to be embraced by critical thinking. Making an 
attempt to philosophize the body, Butler claims that 
signification is traditionally talked about as if it were an 
abstract and universal entity with no connection to the 
body. She insists that we should include the body in the 
debates on hegemonic ideology to examine how the subject is 
culturally produced in terms of gender (231). In her
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preface to Bodies that Matter, however, Butler acknowledges
the difficulties of writing about the body and its
materiality:
I reflected that this wavering might be the 
vocational difficulty of those trained in 
philosophy, always at some distance from corporeal 
matters, who try in that disembodied way to 
demarcate bodily terrains: they invariably miss
the body or, worse, write against it. (ix)
I believe that the anti-porn argument, by insisting on the
porn/erotica segregation, does write against the body.
Wanting to find places that insist on addressing the body,
we may look at the controversial performance art of Annie
Sprinkle, 3 as an attempt to embrace the body in praxis and
to open up this mystified realm of high art. Her
performances aim at removing art from the pedestal of high
culture and making it available to the masses. In that
sense, Sprinkle's performance is a political maneuver. She
is clearly politicizing and problematizing art by bringing
an awareness of the diversity of sexual representations to
aesthetic sensibility.
The discussion of high/low art and the erotica/porn 
split is a legacy of Western metaphysics which has organized 
itself around Aristotelian logic. This phallogocentric 
dichotomy, which is based on either/or exclusionary 
oppositions, has privileged oneness, and denied dialectical 
way of thinking that would be based on a constant movement. 
This logic disciplines us to think in terms of binary 
oppositions like man/woman, self/other, civilized/savage,
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culture/nature, mind/body or the discussed erotica/porn 
dichotomy. Consequently, in the established hierarchy, the 
place of agency historically belongs to the privileged white 
male intellectual who claims the cultural space of art and 
its interpretation. I want to go back to Rich's discussion 
of Not a Love Story to illustrate how this film is 
constructed within the realms of this binary thinking and 
how it ultimately preserves the historically privileged 
space of the male viewer of culture. I also wish to show 
how language escapes the producers of the film and how it 
starts signifying against the authors' intentions. 4 I hope 
to provide a subversive reading of Not a Love Story by using 
it to challenge the anti-porn stance, a position which this 
film attempts to embrace.
Rich provides an extraordinary analysis of Bonnie 
Klein's Not a Love Story, the first documentary addressing 
the issue of pornography from a woman's perspective. Rich 
is very critical about the film's use of the camera, its 
religious preaching, its manipulation with voyeurism, and 
its limited political and social focus. She argues that the 
film ultimately does not help in looking critically at the 
issue of pornography, but that it participates in the 
voyeurism and objectification of women perpetuated by 
patriarchy. She believes that the camera's work is 
representative of the whole film's structure: the camera
along with the male customers are invisible and protected by
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the filmmaker. Often the camera is positioned behind the 
shoulder of the male client, and it never offers a shot from 
the point of view of the women on stage. The film also 
leaves out the economic forces and social pressures that 
make women move into the porn industry. Although the 
filmmakers mention the connection of pornography and 
advertising, they never explicate the crucial correlation 
between the two. They also omit an analysis of consumer 
capitalist culture which propels pornography, and even more 
importantly, they free the film from the issues of race and 
class.
Rich believes that the issue of pornography 
depersonalizes the discourse of sexuality, and that the porn 
debate locks itself within the futile eroticism-versus- 
pornography distinction. Moreover, the whole debate is 
framed within the terms of heterosexuality. Ultimately, Not 
a Love Story, embraced by the mass media, does not pose any 
threat to the male privilege. In its highly emotional 
appeal, it safely overlooks social analysis, historical 
perspectives and larger questions of representation.
I agree with Rich's analysis. What interests me here, 
though, is the film's attempt to freeze and singularise 
female desire, while preserving the masculine codes of 
looking. The act of looking, the gaze, is intertwined with 
relations of power. Since historically the male subject 
occupies the place of active agency, consequently, the gaze
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and the power which governs its course belongs to the male 
who dictates the acts Of looking. However, this is not to 
say that women do not look and that they do not produce 
forms of art that subvert the traditional constructions of 
looking. On the contrary, as the British photographer Grace 
Lau argues in her essay "Confession of a Complete 
Scopophiliac," women artists are fiercely piercing through 
the male-monopolized industry of visual imagery, claiming 
their space as both active producers and lookers (193).
Not a Love Story, however, does not negotiate a space 
for critical analysis about pornography, nor does it 
challenge the structure of a male gaze. Instead, the film 
speaks to the female spectators through tears of the 
participating women researchers, assuming the uniformity of 
female readings of pornography. The film attempts to 
scrutinize the workings of scopophilic pleasure generated by 
pornographic sensibility, but it ends up reinscribing the 
gaze where it traditionally belongs: to the male viewer.
Watching the stripper's, Linda Lee Tracey, cathartic crusade 
through the porn world, we are coerced into thinking that 
women do not derive pleasure from looking. The film also 
suggests that those women who still participate in the 
production of porn for a variety of reasons, simply have not 
awaken yet to see clearly their sins.
In the very beginning, director Bonnie Klein gives us 
her reasons for exploring the world of pornography: "I need
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to understand what is going on behind these doors and how it 
affects my own life." Her way of understanding, however, is 
premised on the assumption that pornography is filth that 
pleases only the male viewer who always has the privilege of 
experiencing voyeuristic pleasure. The camera's insistence 
on showing the satisfied male spectator over and over again 
suggests that males are inherently the ones who look. When 
eventually Linda becomes an active spectator as well, she 
takes no pleasure in looking. Linda and the director visit 
a live theater/video porn arcade in New York, where Linda 
asks the owner to show her something "interesting." After 
he plays the scene for her where a woman is shown in 
bondage, she comments! "That hurts. That really hurts a 
lot. That did not turn me on. Do you have any films where 
they are really making love together, having a good time, 
without any heavy power?" In turn, she is shown another 
scene where a woman performs fellatio. She seems to be 
revolted again: "Look, she is doing it all to him.'' Two
things happen here. In the first instance, Linda assumes 
that pain is universal; i.e. that her pain is also the 
portrayed character's pain, and that there is one legitimate 
category of materials that turn us on. She also assumes 
that the film could offer her a spectatorial pleasure if the 
sexual scene she has just seen involved no power play. 
Moreover, she suggests that the film could become "erotic" 
if only "he was doing it all to her." The implications here
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resonate with Dworkin's presumption about the passivity of a 
female subject involved in sexual relations.
What follows as an attempt to escape the filth of 
pornography is the hugging scene between Linda and Bonnie 
Klein:
Bonnie: "Does it make you worry that...about your own
perception of yourself?
Linda: " No, no, no. It's starting to get to me on an
emotional level, on the humanity level."
Klein refers here to Linda's own situatedness as the 
stripper who started this journey being convinced that she 
earns money in a legitimate way. The purpose of the film's 
narration is to awaken Linda from the darkness of false 
consciousness and to show her the misery and hopelessness of 
her own position. And the film is undoubtedly successful: 
as we watch the unfolding of the narrative structure, Linda 
goes through the transformative act of awakening. It is 
Linda's "humanity level," which is being shaken by the 
unsettling pornographic imagery, that needs to stay intact. 
And it is her "emotional level" which is supposed to strike 
our empathy as the ultimate proof about the dangers of 
pornography. One of the final comments of the film is given 
by a disembodied female voice: "I think that what we have to 
do is to reject the pornographic images of ourselves." The 
concluding implications suggest that we need to embrace our 
"humanity level" by leaving out the body in the fuzzy realm 
of erotica where it would stay free from power relations and
free from the power of looking.
Although the film glances at S/M relations, S/M
dynamics are neither explained in their specificities nor
are they suggested as one of the many possibilities of
sexual representations. The anti-porn logic, that clearly
functions as the premise of Not a Love Story, can be further
challenged and complicated when we do think about
controversial S/M relations whose discourse consistently
insists on highlighting the body. Williams, for example,
suggests that S/M manifestations effectively disrupt the
homogenous construct of sexual representations:
Sadomasochistic scenarios present an even more 
difficult problem in the Meese Commission's 
assessment of violence in sexual representation, 
for here the violence is depicted not as actual 
coercion but as a highly ritualized game in which 
the participants consent to play predetermined 
roles of dominance and submission. Discussion 
thus often ignores the fact that in these scenario 
women can just as well be— and often are— the 
dominators. (18)
Describing the detailed workings of the Meese Commission and
the Women Against Pornography movement, William notes that
the commission's condemnation of violent pornography plays
on the valid concerns about the escalation of violence
against women in the contemporary society at large.
However, the critique of violence rests on the sexual nature
of pornographic materials and fails to identify violence
prevalent in other non-explicitly sexual genres, for
example, in "slasher" films (18):
The commission then contradictorily continues to 
indict pornography as if it were the ultimate 
harm, thus displacing legitimate concern for 
runaway violence and violent sexual crimes onto 
the legally vulnerable scapegoat of pornography. 
(Williams 18-19)
Furthermore, Williams scrutinizes the commission's rhetoric
based on puritanical moral and ethical values which endorse
"normal" sexuality and condemn any other unconventional or
"dangerous" sexual practices. Clearly, S/M scenarios fit
right into the category of both perversion and violence
since they do not conform to the prescribed norms of
"proper" sexual behavior. Because S/M subculture defies
prescribed heterosexual practices, it further undermines and
complicates any homogeneous understanding of pornography.
Williams, for example, who treats pornography as a genre,
suggests that in order to introduce the alternative position
of women's power and pleasure we need to be wary of the
anti-porn arguments which claim that pornography is
incapable of addressing the whole truth of sexuality (22):
Here the implication is that a whole truth of 
sexuality actually exists, outside of language, 
discourse, and power. This idea, I argue, is the 
central fallacy of all the anti-porn feminist 
position: that a single, whole sexuality exists
opposed to the supposed deviations and 
abnormalities of somebody else's fragmentation. 
(23)
Following Williams' line of argumentation, I think that 
instead of being fixated on protecting the notion of 
"natural" sexuality, a more complex feminist position on 
pornography and sexuality must be negotiated. The anti-porn
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belief that if we could get rid of pornographic materials, 
which supposedly cause harm, women would be free from 
objectification, victimization, brutality, and rape, needs 
to be challenged: "the idea that pornographic material
causes men's violence tends to excuse the behavior of men 
who are sexually coercive and violent, by removing the blame 
on to pornography" (Segal 17). Instead of blaming 
pornography for causing violence against women, we can 
concentrate on challenging and resisting the misogynistic 
culture and its dominant fiction. 5 One of the modes of 
resistance may be, for example, "reading" the most 
"innocent" cultural materials like mainstream films and 
commercials which portray and often also encourage violence 
against women. It is this "innocence" of various cultural 
productions which disguises the workings of the 
phallocentric logic and its phobic tendencies manifested 
through the concepts of heterosexism, gender, and race 
purity. We cannot deny that we are historically placed 
within the capitalistic moment where commodification and 
objectification happen; but we can, I believe, intervene in 
the process of cultural constructedness and find pleasure in 
subverting cultural texts by using them in a way they have 
never been intended to be used.
Notes
1. I am referring here to Saussure's discussion of the 
arbitrariness of language and his claim that language has 
neither ideas nor sounds that exist before the linguistic 
system. Saussure suggests here that words cannot reflect a 
reality outside language. This is his controversial claim 
that nothing exists prior to the linguistic practice and 
that there is no inherent "meaning" in words, only 
differences. His claim that neither the signifier nor the 
signified precede the linguistic system suggests that the 
"meaning" does not precede language either, and that it does 
not occupy a sphere outside language. Instead, meaning is 
produced and negotiated through differences within language. 
See Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983).
2. I am using here Derrida's notion that "meaning" is 
not a separate "entity" and that it does not exist outside 
the linguistic system, but that instead it is mediated 
through "differance" within that system. Unlike Saussure, 
who privileges the signified as a reference point, Derrida 
argues that all terms are secondary because they carry 
"traces;" i.e. they carry elements of other terms with which 
they are interconnected and with which they interact. The 
fact that the signified is also a signifier for another 
signified points to the endlessness of play within the
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signifying practice. The concept of "traces" suggests that 
there are no "pure" terms in and of themselves, but rather 
that language rests on the principle of deferral; i.e. on 
the idea that signification is produced through a series of 
differences and is always temporally deferred. In other 
words, each time we speak or write, the significance or 
meaning is "promised" and then deferred so that we can never 
"catch," stabilize, or define meaning. See excerpts from 
"Difference" (1968), A Critical and Cultural Theory Reader, 
ed. by Anthony Easthope and Kate McGowan. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992), 108-132.
3. For a further discussion on Annie Sprinkle's 
performance art see Linda Williams, "A Provoking Agent: The 
Pornography and Performance Art of Annie Sprinkle" in Dirty 
Looks, ed. by Pamela Church Gibson and Roma Gibson.
(London: British Film Institute, 1993), 176-191.
4. For further discussion of Not a Love Story see 
Linda Williams "Conclusion" in Hard Core, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), 265-279.
5. I am referring here to Kaja Silverman's discussion 
on the dominant fiction. She complicates the Althusserian 
model of ideology and instead uses the term of the dominant 
fiction which embraces society's mode of production, 
historical issues of gender, class, race, and the Symbolic 
Order (language and its institutions). See Male
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Subjectivity at the Margins, (New York: Routledge Chapman 
and Hall, 1992).
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